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Abstract. We introduce ologisms. They generate from ologs by extending their logical
expressivity, from the possibility of considering constraints of equational nature only to the
possibility of considering constraints of syllogistic nature, in addition. This is obtained by
taking advantage of the peculiar features of an original diagrammatic logical calculus for
the syllogistic, that make it well-behaved with respect to the design of ologs.
1. Introduction
The word “ologism” is a crasis between the word “olog” and the word “syllogism”. In
turn, the word “olog” itself is a crasis which derives from the expression “ontology log”.
Ologs are category-theoretic models for knowledge representation. As such, they should
be properly qualified as “structured” which in particular means that their construction,
usually referred to as “authoring”, is in accordance with rigorous mathematical criteria
and also that it is possible to consider knowledge-preserving transformations between them.
Ologs record the ontology or “essential nature” of a real situation, in terms of a subjective
world-view. Disorienting as it may be, ologs are designed to communicate such world-views
which although subjective, being planned in accordance with rigorous criteria turn out
to be objectively communicable and their structural soundness objectively determinable.
Ologs are strictly related to the conceptual planning of databases. They can be seen to
correspond to relational database schemes but are much more readable and friendly. We
will not describe the details of this connection but the reader should keep in mind that the
matter treated in this paper could be thought of as potentially connected to that activity
of planning as well as to logic for knowledge representation; in particular, concerning the
latter, see section 10, where a comparison between ologisms and knowledge representation
systems based on Description Logics, DL-KRS, is carried out. The main aim of this paper
is to show how to increase the logical expressivity of ologs by combining them with the
diagrammatic logical calculus for the syllogistic that we introduced in [14, 15], towards the
authoring of ologisms, by taking advantage of the peculiar features of that calculus; mainly
the fact that it is diagrammatic, formally compositional, sound and complete with respect
to syllogistic reasoning. These features make the calculus at issue well-behaved with respect
to the authoring of ologs and provide further structural soundness criterions for them; in
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particular, in connection with the managing of logical contradiction, see section 9. As a final
result the logical expressivity of ologs turns out to be actually increased since the possibility
of imposing equational constraints, typical of ologs, is placed side by side with the possibility
of imposing syllogistic constraints, in addition, which is the peculiarity of ologisms. The
imposable syllogistic constraints correspond to the form of the four fundamental categorical
propositions, that is AAB for “Every A is B”, EAB for “Every A is not B”, IAB for “Some A
is B” and OAB for “Some A is not B”, with A,B types, one of the fundamental components
of an olog. For the sake of argument only, one could imagine to authoring an ologism by
means of a computer program which assists the authors in the verification of equational and
syllogistic constraints, in particular for what regards the avoidance of logical contradictions.
We hasten to highlight that for ologisms this is far from being actually so, differently
from what it actually is for DL-KRS, see [1]. From an overhead standpoint the paper
slides from ologs to ologisms through syllogistic by alternating informal approaches and
formal approaches. To let the paper to be selfcontained as much as possible, the main
mathematical prerequisites are provided as needed, in rigorous terms. More to the point,
ologs are introduced informally in section 2 mainly to let the reader to become acquainted
with their fundamental components, types, aspects and facts, and with them as graphical
objects. Roughly, an olog is a graph with types as nodes and aspects as arcs, together with
equational identities between parallel pairs of aspects declared by facts. In section 3 ologs are
reprised and treated formally as mathematical objects which nature is graphical, algebraic
and logical; this is done by looking at them as linear sketches. Linear sketches are graphical
formal languages that allow the finite specification of the equational theory generated by
a signature with unary operations only, the theory which is the free category over the
underlying graph of an olog, quotiented by the smallest congruence relation generated by
the imposed equational identities which are the facts declared in it. In [20] it is pointed
out that ologs are presentations of categories by means of generators, that is types and
aspects, and relations, that is facts, see section 3. Moreover, in loc. cit., it is also pointed
out that this form of presentation for categories allows to separate the strictly graphical
part of an olog, namely its types and aspects, from its equational part, provided by facts.
By describing ologs by means of linear sketches we wanted to rigorously take account of this,
since linear sketches are the mathematical structures that allow to neatly keep track of this
sort of dichotomy. We wanted to apply a genuine principle of specification to make a useful
distinction between two separate pieces of structure, although strictly interacting. Since this
paper has to do with the enlargement of the logical expressivity of ologs, we felt the need
to reconsider these objects under a proof-theoretical perspective. Thus, section 3 further
proceeds by treating ologs in formal terms, as labelled deductive systems with imposed
equational constraints. If on one side the hint at approaching ologs via linear sketches was
already contained in [20], on the other side, as far as we know, looking at ologs as particular
labelled deductive systems is in our opinion original at least up to a certain extent. In
section 4 we reprise the fundamentals of syllogistic and describe the previously mentioned
diagrammatic logical calculus for it. Although most of the contents of the whole section
can be found in the bibliographic references cited above, they have been almost completely
reworked in view of the main aim of this paper. From subsection 4.1 to subsection 4.5
the approach is informal to let the reader to become familiar with the employment of the
calculus at issue; whereas in subsection 4.6 that calculus is formally described within a
suitable diagrammatic deductive system. In section 5 we introduce ologisms informally to let
the reader already familiar with ologs and syllogistic to understand how they comprise ologs
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as well as syllogistic and moreover, how it is possible to express logical contradiction in them.
In section 6 we describe ologisms formally as deductive systems arising from a combination of
ologs as labelled deductive systems and syllogistic in the form of the diagrammatic deductive
system described in section 4.1. We also describe the logical theory generated by an ologism.
After section 7 in which we provide a definition of what a model of an ologism should be, in
section 8 we introduce suitable logical and semantical consequence relations pertaining to
ologisms and prove appropriate soundness and completeness theorems for those relations. As
far as we know, the content of the sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 is original. As already mentioned,
section 9 is dedicated to the managing of logical contradiction in ologisms. More to the point,
in that section we discuss how the occurrence of pairs of contradictory syllogistic constraints
in ologisms give rise to contradiction in them, so decreeing their structural unsoundness.
Finally, section 10 contains a comparison between ologisms and DL-KRS as regards some
of the basic features shared by the two formalisms. We are aware that the connections
between ologisms and other formal systems should be pointed out and extensively discussed.
Among the ones to which we are thinking of there is intensional logic, term logic as regards
in particular the problem of multiple generality, and the semantic web, for example. If on
one side ologisms have been viewed by us as extending the logical expressivity of ologs in the
way we previously briefly described , on another side one could look at ologisms as extending
syllogistic reasoning in the form of the previously hinted at diagrammatic calculus by means
of ologs providing an ontology for the terms involved in syllogisms. This viewpoint furnishes
further motivations for future work that has to be done.
2. Ologs
In this section we describe the fundamentals of ologs in a rather informal way in order
to establish terminology and notations that will be used throughout the paper and to let
the reader acquire a certain familiarity with the subject, that will be presented in rigorous
mathematical terms in section 3. The reader who is interested in deepening her knowledge
about ologs is invited to consult [19, 20] and the bibliographic references therein. The
way in which the content of this section is arranged derives from a personal rereading of
related contents in the just cited bibliographic references. The word “olog” comes from the
expression “ontology log” as a sort of crasis. Ologs provide category-theoretic models for
knowledge representation but very little category theory is required in order to understand
and start using them. Actually, some acquaintance with the notions of graph and function
is sufficient. Nonetheless, the fact that the construction and the employment of ologs are in
accordance with rules that are justifiable in rigorous mathematical terms has to be firmly
kept in mind because it makes ologs structured models for knowledge representation,
so that it makes sense to consider knowledge-preserving transformations between them,
for instance. Ologs are stricly connected to the conceptual planning of databases. In
fact, they can be read as relational database schemes and their design aims to be much
more simple than learning a database definition language. Although the content of this
paper is related to the conceptual planning of databases via ologs, we will not describe the
details of how they correspond to relational database schemes but refer the reader to the
previously cited bibliographic references, from which we have taken some of the examples in
this section.
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2.1. Authoring ologs. Following [19, 20] we will henceforth refer to the author of an
olog as to the fictitious person who designed it. The action of designing an olog will be
henceforth referred to as authoring.
Remark 2.1. As underlined in [19, 20], an olog captures a part of a subjective world-
view of its author. Thus, it may well be that a person A examining the olog designed by
a person B does not agree with the world-view captured by B’s olog, but the dispute that
consequently may arise is not a problem with the olog under consideration. As will be made
clear in what follows, ologs are designed in accordance with rules that ensure that they be
structurally sound rather than they faithfully reflect reality.
Types, aspects and facts are the fundamental components of an olog. In the rest of this
section we will describe each of them in order.
2.2. Types. In an olog, a type is represented by a box containing a singular indefinite
phrase describing the generic representative example of a whole class of things. Examples of
types are
a man a mammal
a pair (p, (l, r)) where p is a person
and (l, r) is a pair of shoes
and it is a rule of good practice to explicitly provide variable names for the instances of a
compound type such as the last two above. That is, it is preferable to replace a compound
type such as
a man and a woman
by
a man m and a woman w
or also by
a pair (m,w) where m is a man and w is a woman
Notation 2.2. For typographical reasons, it may be convenient to write types in-line by just
hinting at the box surroinding them, like this: pa man m and a woman wq.
The rules of good practice for authoring structurally sound types prescribe
that they be represented by a box with text inside that has to
- begin with an indefinite article “a” or “an”,
- refer to a distinction made and recognizable by the author,
- refer to a distinction for which instances can be documented,
- be the common name that each instance of that distinction can be called,
- not end by a punctuation mark,
- declare all variables in a compound type.
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2.3. Aspects. Aspects apply to types. An aspect of a thing is a way of looking at it or
measuring it. In an olog, aspects are represented by labelled arrows emanating from one
type toward another. For types A,B an aspect A
f // B is an aspect of the things in A
that has things in B as results of certain measurements performed in the way described
by the label f . In an olog, the label of an aspect must be a fragment of text beginning
with a verb, yielding a well-formulated English phrase when the reading of the text in the
box of the type from which the aspect starts is followed by the reading of the label itself
further followed by the reading of the text in the box of the type to which the aspect arrives.
For instance, to establish that a woman is a person amounts to pointing out an aspect of a
woman, which is represented as a labelled arrow
a woman
is // a person (2.1)
in an olog, and has to be read “a woman is a person”. A further example of an aspect in an
olog is pa bookq has as first author // pa personq , which has to be read “a book has
as first author a person”. Moreover, the label of a structurally sound aspect must
describe a functional relationship. Intuitively, if the types of an olog are interpreted as
sets, as it will be rigorously done in section 3, then an aspect A
f // B will be interpreted
as a function from the set interpreting A to the set interpreting B.
Notation 2.3. Types and aspects allow the authoring of first examples of interesting ologs,
such as
a pair (x, y) where
x and y are integers
x
ww
y
''
an integer an integer
(2.2)
which shows that in practice, if confusion is not likely to arise, the label of an aspect can be
shortened or dropped altogether. With reference to the olog (2.2) one can observe that the
expression “a pair (x, y) where x and y are integers x an integer” is not a well-formulated
English phrase. Actually, the x labelling the arrow is an abbreviation for “yields, as the value
of x,”. So, in the end, the aspect in question has to be read as “a pair (x, y) where x and y
are integers yields, as the value of x, an integer” which is a well-formulated English phrase;
also making clear that the single character x has been used to make reference to the intended
interpretation of the aspect that it is labelling, namely the projection function
x :
a pair (x, y) where
x and y are integers
(x,y)7→x // an integer
To summarize, the rules of good practice for authoring structurally sound
aspects prescribe that they be represented by labelled arrows emanating from a type toward
a type and that the label of the aspect be a fragment of text that must
- begin with a verb,
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- yield a well-formulated English phrase, when the reading of the text in the box of the type
from which the aspect starts is followed by the reading of the label of its arrow further
followed by the reading of the text in the box of the type to which the aspect arrives,
- declare a functional relationship so that each instance of the type from which the aspect
starts is related to a uniquely designated instance of the type to which the aspect arrives.
2.4. Paths of aspects. In an olog there can be aspects in a row, that is aspects which
follow one the other via intermediate types that link them. Such paths of aspects have to
be read by inserting the word “which” or “who” after the text of each intermediate type.
For instance, in the olog
a child
is // a person
has, as birthday
""
has as parents //
a pair (w,m)
where w is
a woman and
m is a man
w // a woman
a date
includes // a year
(2.3)
there are two different paths of aspects: the one from pa childq to pa womanq and the one
from pa childq to pa yearq. They have to be read as “a child is a person who has as parents
a pair (w,m) where w is a woman and m is a man which yields, as the value of w, a woman”
and as “a child is a person who has, as birthday a date which includes a year”, respectively.
Remark 2.4. For future reference we here observe in passing that this way of reading
paths of aspects in an olog provides a law of composition of aspects. This point will be
reprised in subsection 2.5 below, further discussed in section 3.
2.5. Facts. In an olog, facts amount to the declaration of equational identities between
pairs of aspects. It is the possibility of declaring facts in ologs that peculiarly makes explicit
the category theoretic ground on which their authoring is based, and makes ologs much
more expressive than they would be if they were just graphs with types as nodes and aspects
as arcs. In an olog, the possibility of expressing facts arises because a pair of aspects one
following the other, say A
f // B
g // C , can be read one after the other as illustrated
in subsection 2.4, giving rise to a functionally designated composite aspect A
f ;g // C ,
so that the aspects f , g and f ; g fit in what is, by construction, a paradigmatic example of
commutative diagram, that is
A
f ;g
X
++
f // B
g

C
(2.4)
declaring that the result of measuring via f and then via g is equal to the result of measuring
in one step via f ; g, by the very definition of composite aspect; and the checkmark inside
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the diagram is there to communicate precisely this, namely that the diagram (2.4) is
commutative, thus representing a fact.
Remark 2.5. Diagrams and commutative diagrams will be rigorously discussed in section 3.
Example 2.6. As an example of a fact which holds by construction in the sense just
illustrated, one can consider
a person
has as parents a
pair (w,m) where
w is a woman
and m is a man
which yields, as
the value of w,
,,
has as parents // a pair (w,m) where w is a
woman and m is a man
X w

a woman
where, to be explicit, the labels involved are
f = has as parents
g = w = yields, as the value of w,
f ; g =
has as parents a
pair (w,m) where
w is a woman
and m is a man
which yields, as
the value of w,
but there is to say that a fact that holds by construction is not truly informative. The
informative facts are those which are imposed to clarify matters. For instance, the previous
fact can be turned into the following more informative one:
a person
has as mother ,,
has as parents // a pair (w,m) where w is a
woman and m is a man
X w

a woman
(2.5)
declaring that a woman parent is nothing but a mother, and the checkmark is there to
communicate this. Explicitly, the imposed equational identity is
has as parents a
pair (w,m) where
w is a woman
and m is a man
which yields, as
the value of w,
= has as mother
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However, the rigorous way to impose equational identities between paths of aspects in an
olog will be discussed in subsection 3.4.
Remark 2.7. Although maybe already clear, it is worth to clarify that facts declare
equational identities between parallel aspects, where two aspects in an olog are said
to be parallel if they emanate from the same type and point toward the same type.
The rules of good practice for authoring structurally sound facts prescribe that
facts are declared by drawing a checkmark in the planar space that a parallel pair of aspects
circumscribe on the page or by means of an equational identity between them. Every fact in
an olog must be so explicitly declared, no matter how obvious it may seem.
3. Ologs as labelled deductive systems with imposed equational constraints
In section 2 we introduced and discussed ologs in a rather informal way. On the contrary,
the aim of this section is to describe ologs first as linear sketches and then, to complete
the description, as labelled deductive systems with imposed equational constraints, both of
which are rigorously defined mathematical structures. For selfcontainment, we recall all the
fundamental notions that will be needed, mainly concerning graphs, categories, diagrams and
commutative diagrams in categories, although not extensively but as much as will be useful
for the sequel of the paper. The reader who is interested in deepening her knowledge about
the notions that will be introduced in this section is referred to [2] and [9], for instance.
3.1. Graphs and commutative diagrams.
Definition 3.1. A graph is a 4-tuple G = (G0, G1, ∂0, ∂1) where
- G0 is a set of nodes, that will be usually denoted by upper case letters A,B,C, . . .;
- G1 is a set of arcs, that will be usually denoted by lower case letters f, g, h, . . .;
- ∂0 : G1 → G0 is a function that will be referred to as source;
- ∂1 : G1 → G0 is a function that will be referred to as target.
For any two nodes A,B of G, a path from A to B in G is a 3-tuple (A, (f1, f2, . . . , fn), B)
where (f1, f2, . . . , fn) ∈ Gn1 , A = ∂0(f1), B = ∂1(fn) and, for every i = 1, . . . , n − 1,
∂1(fi) = ∂0(fi+1). Two paths of G are said to be parallel if they have the same first and
third component, that is if they start and end at the same nodes.
Remark 3.2. The notion of path in a graph makes sense for n = 0 too. In that case, the
notion identifies the empty path on the node A coinciding with B, that is (A, (), A).
Example 3.3. Most of the time we will be concerned with graphs with a finite number of
nodes and a finite number of arcs. Because of this, we will be able to specify their components
in explicit set-theoretic terms. For instance, the 4-tuple
G = ({A,B,C}, {f, g}, {(f,A), (g,B)}, {(f,B), (g,A)}) (3.1)
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identifies the graph whose components are
G0 = {A,B,C}
G1 = {f, g}
∂0 :
[
f 7→ A
g 7→ B
]
: G1 → G0
∂1 :
[
f 7→ B
g 7→ A
]
: G1 → G0
but observe that in the 4-tuple (3.1) the functions ∂0, ∂1 have been given as the functional re-
lations ∂0 = {(f,A), (g,B)} ⊆ {f, g}×{A,B,C}, ∂1 = {(f,B), (g,A)} ⊆ {f, g}×{A,B,C},
respectively.
Notation 3.4. For G a graph and f one of its arcs, the writing f : A // B or the
writing A
f // B , equivalently, will be used to indicate that the source of f is the node A
and that the target of f is the node B.
Definition 3.5. For G and H graphs, a homomorphism of graphs from G to H is a pair
F = (F0, F1) whose components are functions F0 : G0 → H0, F1 : G1 → H1 such that for
every arc f : A→ B of G, F1(f) : F0(A)→ F0(B) in H. A homomorphism of graphs from
G to H will be written F : G → H and also referred to as a diagram of shape G in H.
Remark 3.6. When confusion is not likely to arise, sometimes we will identify a diagram
with the drawing of the graph which is its image. For instance, let G be the graph (3.1) and
H be the graph
({0, 1, 2}, {01, 10}, {(01, 0), (10, 1)}, {(01, 1), (10, 0)}).
The diagram F : H → G identified by the assignments
F0 :
 0 7→ A1 7→ B
2 7→ C
 : H0 → G0
F1 :
[
01 7→ f
10 7→ g
]
: H1 → G1
has image which can be represented by the drawing
A
f
++ B
g
kk C
Definition 3.7. Let G be a graph. Put G2 .= {(f, g) ∈ G1 × G1 | ∂1(f) = ∂0(g)}. G is a
category if it is equipped with functions composition ◦ : (f, g) 7→ f ◦ g : G2 → G1, and
identity id : A 7→ idA : G0 → G1, such that
(1) for every (f, g) ∈ G2, ∂0(f ◦ g) = ∂0(f) and ∂1(f ◦ g) = ∂1(g);
(2) for every f, g, h ∈ G1, if (f, g) ∈ G2 and (g, h) ∈ G2, then f ◦ (g ◦ h) = (f ◦ g) ◦ h;
(3) for every A ∈ G0, ∂0(idA) = ∂1(idA) = A;
(4) for every f : A→ B, idA ◦ f = f ◦ idB = f .
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Arbitrary categories will be henceforth usually denoted by upper case letters in blackboard
style, such as C,D, . . ., whereas particular categories will be henceforth usually denoted by
upper case letters in bold face style.
Example 3.8.
(1) Sets as nodes, and functions between them as arcs, identify a category Sets:
- for fuctions f : a 7→ f(a) : A→ B and g : b 7→ g(b) : B → C, their composition is the
function f ◦ g : a 7→ g(f(a)) : A→ C;
- for A a set, the identity arc at A is the identity function idA : a 7→ a : A→ A.
(2) Graphs as nodes, and homomorphisms of graphs between them as arcs, identify a category
Grph.
- for homomorphisms of graphs F = (F0, F1) : G → H and G = (G0, G1) : H → K, their
composition is F •G = (F0 ◦G0, F1 ◦G1) : G → K, where ◦ is composition in Sets;
- for G a graph, the identity arc at G is idG = (idG0 , idG1) : G → G, with idG0 , idG1 the
identity functions at G0, G1 in Sets, respectively.
(3) The free category generated by a graph G is G∗, whose nodes are the nodes of G,
whose arcs from A to B, say, are the paths from A to B in G.
- for arcs (f1, f2, . . . , fn) : A→ B and (g1, g2, . . . , gm) : B → C in G∗, that is for paths
(A, (f1, f2, . . . , fn), B), (B, (g1, g2, . . . , gm), C) in G, respectively, their composition is
the arc (f1, f2, . . . , fn, g1, g2, . . . , gm) : A→ C obtained by concatenation of the paths
under consideration;
- for A a node, the identity arc at A is the empty path at A, that is (A, (), A), see
remark 3.2.
Definition 3.9. Let G be a graph and let C be a category. A commutative diagram of
shape G in C is a diagram F : G → C such that for every nodes A,B of G, for every parallel
paths (A, (f1, f2, . . . , fn), B), (A, (g1, g2, . . . , gm), B) in G,
F1(f1) ◦ F1(f2) ◦ · · · ◦ F1(fn) = F1(g1) ◦ F1(g2) ◦ · · · ◦ F1(gm) (3.2)
in C.
Remark 3.10. After remark 3.2, if, for instance, n = 0, the identity (3.2) amounts to
idA = F1(g1) ◦ F1(g2) ◦ · · · ◦ F1(gm) in C.
3.2. Linear sketches. Linear sketches are graphs with imposed commutativity conditions.
Whereas equational theories are usually specified by means of formal languages of symbolic
nature, linear sketches are graphical formal languages that allow the finite specification of
the equational theory generated by a signature with unary operations only; namely, the
equational theory which is the free category on the underlying graph of the sketch, quotiented
by the smallest congruence relation generated by the imposed commutativity conditions.
This construction will be described in subsection 3.3 below.
Definition 3.11. A linear sketch is a pair S = (G,D) where G is a graph and D is a
set of diagrams in G. For C a category, a model of S in C is a homomorphism of graphs
M : G → C such that for every diagram D : S → G in D, the diagram M•D : S → C is
commutative. A model of S in Sets will be henceforth referred to as set-theoretic, but
see remark 3.19 below.
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Remark 3.12. Commutative diagrams are the category-theoretic way to express equations
and in a sketch S = (G,D) the elements of D represent the equations that must be true in
every model of the sketch.
Example 3.13. (1) The linear sketch for graphs is G = (G, ∅) where
G = ({N,A}, {s, t}, {(s,A), (t, A)}, {(s,N), (t,N)})
which can be more conveniently seen by drawing it as
A
s //
t
// N
namely as “the graph of graphs”.
(2) The linear sketch underlying a category C is C = (C,D) where C is the graph
underlying C and D is the set of all the commutative diagrams in C.
3.3. The equational theory generated by a linear sketch. If on one hand, a category
identifies a linear sketch, see point (2) in examples 3.13, on the other hand a linear sketch
S = (G,D) identifies a category Th(S) which is the equational theory generated by S. In a
way that we will rigorously make precise below, the category Th(S) is a quotient of G∗, the
free category generated by the graph G, see point (3) of the examples 3.8.
Definition 3.14. Let C be a category with underlying graph C = (C0, C1, ∂0, ∂1), and let
∼⊆ C1 × C1 be a relation. The congruence relation generated by ∼ is the smallest
equivalence relation ∼∗ that contains ∼ such that
(1) for every (f, g) ∈ C1 × C1, (f, g) ∈∼∗ only if ∂0(f) = ∂0(g) and ∂1(f) = ∂1(g);
(2) for every f, g, h, k ∈ C1 as in the diagram
A
h // B
f //
g
// C
k // D
if f ∼∗ g then h ◦ f ∼∗ h ◦ g and f ◦ k ∼∗ g ◦ k.
The quotient category of C by ∼∗ is C/ ∼∗, whose nodes are the nodes of C, whose arcs
are ∼∗-equivalence classes of arcs of C with composition and identity via representatives.
Definition 3.15. Let S = (G,D) be a linear sketch. The equational theory generated
by S is the category Th(S) which is the quotient category G∗/ ∼D where ∼D is the smallest
congruence relation that contains all the pair of parallel paths of G∗ from any diagram
D ∈ D.
Remark 3.16. LetS = (G,D) be a linear sketch. Every diagram in D becomes commutative
in Th(S) and, in a suitable sense which can be made technically precise, the construction of
Th(S) out of S is the best way to make this to happen. For details, the reader is referred
to [2].
Example 3.17. The equational theory generated by the linear sketch underlying a category
C, see point (2) in examples 3.13, is isomorphic to C, that is C ' Th(C).
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3.4. Ologs as linear sketches. Ologs are made of types, aspects and facts to be rigorously
specified in accordance with respective rules of good practice, described in section 2. Also,
as observed in subsection 2.5, it is because of the possibility of specifying facts, as a way
to impose equational identities between aspects, that ologs are more expressive than they
would be if they were just graphs with types as nodes and aspects as arcs. From this and
what have been previously discussed in this section it follows that an olog can be described
as a linear sketch O = (O,F) where O is a graph with types as nodes and aspects as arcs,
and F is a set of diagrams in O, to be referred to as facts, that have to be commutative
in every set-theoretic model M : O → Sets of the sketch O, in particular, see remark 3.19
below.
Remark 3.18. We hasten to warn the reader that this is not the end of the story. In
subsection 2.4 we described how paths of aspects in an olog have to be read, and in remark 2.4
we observed that that way of reading paths of aspects in an olog provides a law of composition
of pairs of aspects in a row. The possibility of formally composing arcs in a graph, hence in
particular of formally composing aspects in (the underlying graph of) an olog, is guaranteed
in the so-called labelled deductive systems, that we will discuss in subsection 3.5. Thus,
ologs are linear sketches but prima facie. For the moment we are happy with this but, in
section 3.8, we will recognize ologs under a more proof-theoretic perspective, as labelled
deductive systems with imposed equational constraints on their formal proofs. This is needed
for the pursueing of the main aim of this paper, which is to increase the logical expressivity
of ologs with the possibility of considering syllogistic constraints beyond the equational ones.
Remark 3.19. In this paper the models of ologs that we will consider will be exclusively
set-theoretic. With respect to this, we draw the attention of the reader to observe that
among the others, the aspects of an olog whose label is the predicate is are somewhat
peculiar, because such an aspect, say A
is // B , indicates that something relevant to the
instances of type A is forgot to subsume them in a class of instances of type B, which are at
least as general as those of type A, if not even genuinely more general. In view of this, it
appears natural to request that those aspects be always interpreted as inclusion functions
by any set-theoretic model. More explicitly, for O an olog, A
is // B an aspect of it and
M : O → Sets a set-theoretic model, we let is to be modelled by the inclusion function of
the set MA in the set MB.
Remark 3.20. In [20] it is pointed out that ologs are based on the mathematical notion of
category. More precisely, in loc. cit. it is pointed out that an olog is a presentation of a
category by generators, that is types and aspects, and relations, that is facts; moreover, it is
also pointed out that this form of presentation for categories allows to separate the strictly
graphical part of an olog, namely its types and aspects, from its propositional, we would
say equational, part, provided by facts. By describing ologs by means of linear sketches we
wanted to rigorously take account of this, since, towards the achievement of the purposes
of this paper, see remark 3.18, linear sketches are the mathematical structures that allow
to neatly keep track of this sort of dichotomy. We wanted to apply a genuine principle of
specification to make a useful distinction between two separate pieces of structure, although
strictly interacting. Now, the moral is the following: from a purely abstract mathematical
point of view considering ologs as presentations of categories or as linear sketches amounts
to the same thing, on the base of point (2) of example 3.13 and of example 3.17, but it is
OLOGISMS 13
not like that in view of the purposes of this paper: we find that approaching ologs by means
of linear sketches turned out to be more fruitful in respect to those.
Example 3.21. The linear sketch O = (O,F) that formally presents the olog (2.5), is
identified by the following data.
- For O:
– the set of types of O is
{pa personq, a pair (w,m) where w is a
woman and m is a man
, pa womanq}
– the set of aspects of O is
{has as parents,yields, as the value of w,,has as mother}
– the source and target functions are
∂0 :

has as parents 7→ pa personq
has as mother 7→ pa personq
yields, as the values of w, 7→
a pair (w,m)
where w is
a woman and
m is a man

∂1 :

has as parents 7→
a pair (w,m)
where w is
a woman and
m is a man
has as mother 7→ pa womanq
yields, as the values of w, 7→ pa womanq

- F has just one element F that is the diagram of shape
0
02 
01 // 1
12

2
in O identified by the assignments
F0 :

0 7→ pa personq
1 7→
a pair (w,m)
where w is
a woman and
m is a man
2 7→ pa womanq

F1 :
 01 7→ has as parents02 7→ has as mother
12 7→ yields, as the values of w,

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A model of O = (O,F) is M : O → Sets identified by the assignments
M0 :

pa personq 7→ {Michael,Diana, John,Mary,Susan}
a pair (w,m)
where w is
a woman and
m is a man
7→ {(Susan, Juan), (Elen1,Albert), (Elen2, Jerry)}
pa womanq 7→ {Susan,Elen1,Elen2,Clare}

M1 :

has as parents 7→

Michael 7→ (Susan, Juan)
Diana 7→ (Susan, Juan)
John 7→ (Elen1,Albert)
Mary 7→ (Elen2, Jerry)
Susan 7→ (Elen2, Jerry)

yields, as the value of w, 7→
 (Susan, Juan) 7→ Susan(Elen1,Albert) 7→ Elen1
(Elen2, Jerry) 7→ Elen2

has as mother 7→

Michael 7→ Susan
Diana 7→ Susan
John 7→ Elen1
Mary 7→ Elen2
Susan 7→ Elen2


for instance.
The aim of the remaining part of this section is to complete the mathematical description
of ologs in terms of linear sketches, by pointing out that ologs possess a proof-theoretic
structure that have to be taken into account, especially if, as in our case, one is concerned
with an investigation directed toward the extension of their logical expressivity. As already
hinted at in remark 3.18 we will be dealt with so-called labelled deductive systems to see
ologs as labelled deductive systems with imposed equational constraints, more precisely, in
subsection 3.8. For selfcontainment we will recall all the fundamental notions that will be
needed.
3.5. Labelled deductive systems. On labelled deductive systems our main reference
is [9], from which we took most of the material concerning them, by conveniently rephrasing
it.
Definition 3.22. A labelled deductive system is a graph L with
(1) distinguished arcs to be referred to as axioms, among which, for every node A, there
are specified identity axioms idA : A→ A;
(2) rules of inference for generating new arcs from old, among which, there is the rule
A
f // B B
g // C
A
fg // C
(3.3)
So, the nodes and the arcs of a labelled deductive system will be henceforth referred to as
formulas and labelled sequents, respectively. A proof tree of L is a tree where each
node is a labelled sequent and each branching is an instance of an inference rule.
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Example 3.23. The free category generated by a labelled deductive system L is
the category Th(L) whose nodes are the formulas of L, whose arcs are equivalence classes of
labelled sequents of L by the smallest congruence relation generated by identifying
(1) the proof tree
A
f // B B
g // C
A
fg // C C
h // D
A
(fg)h // D
with the proof tree
A
f // B
B
g // C C
h // D
B
gh // C
A
f(gh) // D
(2) the proof tree
A
f // B B
idB // B
A
fidB // B
with the proof tree
A
f // B
(3) the proof tree
A
idA // A A
f // B
A
idAf // B
with the proof tree
A
f // B
plus the identification conditions imposed by the inference rules of L other than (3.3), if
present.
Example 3.24. The labelled deductive system freely generated by a graph G is L(G)
whose formulas are the nodes of G, also referred to as atomic, whose axioms are the arcs of
G together with, for every formula A, the identity axioms idA : A→ A, and (3.3) the sole
rule of inference.
Example 3.25. As a particular case of example 3.23 consider Th(L(G)), namely the
free category generated by the free labelled deductive system generated by a graph G, see
example 3.24. Explicitly, Th(L(G)) is the category whose nodes are the nodes of G, whose
arcs are equivalent classes of labelled sequents of L(G) by the equivalence relation generated by
exclusively the identification conditions (a), (b), (c) in example (3.23). By construction, in
Th(L(G)) the diagrams commute solely on the base of the axioms for the category structure,
see definition 3.7 and see the discussion in the subsection 3.6 below. Moreover, the categories
Th(L(G)) and G∗, see point (3) of examples 3.8, are equivalent, in a sense which can
16 RUGGERO PAGNAN
be made technically precise; but for what concern us it is enough to observe that those
categories have the same nodes and that an arc of Th(L(G)), say from A to B, has a
canonical representative which can be written as a formal product f1f2 · · · fn : A → B of
arcs f1 : A→ A1, f2 : A1 → A2, . . . , fn : An−1 → B of G, without occurrences of parenthesis
and of identity axioms, because of the identification conditions (a), (b), (c), except for n = 0
and A necessarily coinciding with B, in which case f1f2 · · · fn = idA : A→ A. Now, up to
unessential formal details such canonical representatives are nothing but morphisms of G∗.
3.6. Commutative diagrams as equivalent proofs. Roughly, in category theory a
coherence theorem is a result establishing that all the diagrams constructed in accordance
with the definitory data of a categorial structure commute in all the categories that carry
such a structure, that is in every model of the categorial structure at issue. So, coherence
theorems are about categorial structures in abstract. The fundamental reference on the
subject is [11], but the reader is invited to consult [13, 4] as well. After the pioneering
work of Lambek, see [6, 7, 5, 8], proof-theoretic methods toward the obtainment of specific
coherence theorems have been widely and successfully employed, see [18, 17] for instance,
giving rise to what is nowadays referred to as categorial proof theory, on which the
reader is invited to consult [3]. In essence, for what concern us, the result that has to be kept
in mind is that commutative diagrams coincide with equivalent proofs in suitable
labelled deductive systems, see [12]; a fact that we will henceforth freely use.
3.7. The equational theory generated by a linear sketch, reprised. Recall from
subsection 3.3, definition 3.15, the construction of the equational theory Th(S) generated by
a linear sketch S = (G,D). On the base of the equivalence of the categories G∗ and Th(L(G)),
see example 3.25, the fact that commutative diagrams coincide with equivalent proofs, see
subsection 3.6, and the fact that the diagrams in D must commute in every model of S, see
remark 3.12, it is possible to give a proof-theoretical description of Th(S). It is the category
Th(L(G)) plus the identification conditions on proof trees that derive from the identification
of all the pairs of parallel paths in any diagram D ∈ D. Explicitly, for every diagram D and
pair of parallel paths, say (A, (f1, f2, . . . , fn), B) and (A, (g1, g2, . . . , gm), B) in the image of
D in G, one has the identification relation Df1Df2 · · ·Dfn ∼ Dg1Dg2 · · ·Dgm in Th(L(G))
that becomes equality in Th(S).
3.8. Ologs as labelled deductive systems with imposed equational constraints.
In subsection 3.4 we described ologs as linear sketches. In remark 3.18 we observed that that
was not the end of the story, because the way the aspects in a row in an olog O = (O,F)
are read, see subsection 2.4, provides a law of composition of aspects which, by virtue of
definition 3.22, turns the graph O into the labelled deductive system L(O), see example 3.24.
More to the point, for O = (O,F) an olog, the labelled deductive system L(O) has
- as formulas, the types of O;
- as axioms, the aspects of O, together with, for every type A, the identity aspect A is // A ;
- as rule of inference the sole rule
A
f // B B
g // C
A
f ;g // C
(3.4)
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with f ; g the label obtained by reading f followed by g as described in subsection 2.4.
As a further step, the application of the identification conditions listed in example 3.23
provides the free category Th(L(O)) and, moreover, the quotient of this by the smallest
congruence relation generated by the facts F , provides the equational theory generated by
O, Th(O).
Example 3.26. The olog (2.5) can be seen to be built in steps has just described. Consider
the linear sketch O = (O,F) that formally presents it in example 3.21. First, it is convenient
to draw the graph O as
a person
has as mother
,,
has as parents // a pair (w,m) where w is a
woman and m is a man
w

a woman
then to draw the category Th(L(O) as
a person
f ;g
))has as mother ,,
has as parents // a pair (w,m) where w is a
woman and m is a man
w

a woman
where we did not indicate the identity aspects associated to each type since they are irrelevant
by virtue of the identification conditions (b) and (c) in example 3.23, and where
f ; g =
has as parents a
pair (w,m) where
w is a woman
and m is a man
which yields, as
the value of w,
then to draw the equational theory Th(O)
a person
has as mother ,,
has as parents // a pair (w,m) where w is a
woman and m is a man
X w

a woman
as the resulting olog, where the checkmark is there to communicate the application of the
identification has as mother = f ; g imposed by the fact F ∈ F described in example 3.21.
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4. A diagrammatic calculus for the syllogistic
In this section we recall some basics on syllogistic and describe the main features of the
diagrammatic calculus for it that we introduced in [14], and further investigated in [15].
We will not be exhaustive about syllogistic. The reader who is interested in deepening
her knowledge about syllogistic is invited to consult the relevant bibliographic references
listed in the previously cited papers, in particular [10, 16] to begin with. More to the
point for what concern the mentioned diagrammatic calculus, in this section we will start
introducing it in subsection 4.2 and proceed futher in describing its main features up to
subsection 4.5 in a rather informal way but, in subsection 4.6, for reasons that have to do
with the investigation of the possibility of extending the logical expressivity of ologs by
imposing syllogistic constraints beyond the equational ones, via the diagrammatic calculus
at issue, we will formally treat it within a suitable diagrammatic deductive system that we
will describe in detail in subsection 4.6.
4.1. Syllogistic. Syllogistic was identified by Aristotle as a formal system for logical ar-
gumentation in the natural language, probably the first ever known. It is based on the
categorical propositions
ASP : Every S is P ESP : Every S is not P
ISP : Some S is P OSP : Some S is not P
(4.1)
where the upper case letters S, P are substitutable with meaningful expressions of the natural
language, that henceforth will be referred to as terms. Thus, “black dog” or “good friend”
are examples of terms and “Every good friend is a black dog” and “Some black dog is not
a good friend” are examples of categorical propositions; in each categorical proposition,
S and P are referred to as subject and predicate, respectively; ASP , ISP , ESP , OSP
are the traditional names that the medieval logicians gave to each scheme of categorical
proposition, respectively. Specifically, A and I are taken as vowels from the latin word
AdfIrmo, for affirmation, whereas E and O are taken as vowels from the latin word nEgO,
for negation, so that the categorical propositions which can be bringed back to the schemes
ASP , ISP are said to be universal affirmative, particular affirmative propositions,
respectively, whereas those which can be bringed back to the schemes ESP , OSP are said
to be universal negative, particular negative propositions, respectively. As they stand,
the categorical propositions occupy the vertices of an ideal square, which is the so-called
square of opposition. Various interrelations link the categorical propositions in the square
but notably, the categorical propositions that occupy its diagonally opposite vertices are in
contradiction, since they are the negation of each other and so cannot be jointly affirmed.
A syllogism in the natural language is a logical argument of the form
P1, P2 ` C (4.2)
where ` stays for “therefore”, and P1, P2, C are categorical propositions that are distinguished
as first premise, second premise and conclusion, respectively. More precisely, for (4.2) to
be a syllogism, there must be three terms involved in it, typically denoted by S,M,P , as
follows: M must occur in both the premisses and cannot occur in the conclusion, whereas,
in accordance with the traditional way of writing syllogisms, P must occur in the first
premise and in the conclusion as the predicate of the latter, whereas S must occur in the
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second premise and in the conclusion as the subject of the latter. M is usually referred to
as middle term.
Example 4.1. The logical argument
Every mammal is not able to fly,
Every donkey is a mammal
therefore
Every donkey is not able to fly
(4.3)
is a syllogism in which “mammal” is M , “donkey” is S and “able to fly” is P . Schematically,
the previous syllogism can be bringed back to the form EMP ,ASM ` ESP .
Example 4.2. The logical argument
Every mammal is able to fly,
Some mammal is a donkey
therefore
Some donkey is able to fly
(4.4)
is a syllogism that can be bringed back to the form AMP , IMS ` ISP .
4.2. A diagrammatic calculus for the syllogistic. The schemes of logical arguments of
the form (4.2) that are recognizable as syllogisms in accordance with the previously described
structure are 256 in total. Among them, Aristotle has been able to classify the 24 syllogisms
which are valid, namely those whose conclusion logically follows from their premisses by
virtue of the canon of inference which is the deletion of the middle term. In this sense,
the syllogisms (4.3) and (4.4) are both valid but the syllogism
Every mammal is not able to fly,
Some mammal is a donkey
therefore
Some donkey is able to fly
(4.5)
is not; but we admit that we established these three facts by appealing, up to a certain
extent, to our experience about donkeys, mammals and animals that are able to fly.
Remark 4.3. We hasten to observe that a logical argument must be recognizable as valid
by virtue of its form, exclusively, let alone any reference to the experience of the rational
being considering it or to whatsoever notion of truth. Relevantly, we point out that the
syllogisms (4.3) and (4.4) are valid although in each of them one premise is false, assuming
truth to coincide with reality, as it seems reasonable for the syllogistic, in accordance with [21].
In fact, for the syllogism (4.4) it is false that every mammal is able to fly whereas for the
syllogism (4.3) it is false that every mammal is not able to fly, since bats are mammals that
are able to fly.
With regard to syllogisms the question is: is it possible to formally implement the above
mentioned canon of inference as an easy to recognize deductive step of calculation?
We answer to this question by describing a diagrammatic deductive calculus for the
syllogistic that captures the valid syllogisms exactly, in the sense that on the base of it the
valid syllogisms are those whose conclusion follows from their premisses as the result of a
diagrammatic step of calculation and just those. This is proved in [14].
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We rephrase the square of opposition (4.1) by considering suitable diagrammatic rep-
resentations of the corresponding categorical propositions, as labelled diagrams, like
this
S
ASP // P S //
ESP• Poo
S
ISP•oo // P S OSP•oo // • Poo
(4.6)
and, for the future, we here request to consider each of the previous diagrams as an
indecomposable piece of syntax, as witnessed by the associated label. Consequently, no
proper part of a diagram among the previous will be considered as conveying any meaningful
piece of information in itself. The rigorous justification of the previous request will be given
in subsection 4.6.
Remark 4.4. We observe in passing that the diagrams (4.6) are diagrams in the sense of
definition 3.5, of shapes
0
01 // 1 0
01 // 1 2
21oo
0 1
10oo 12 // 2 0 1
12 //10oo 2 3
32oo
(4.7)
respectively, in the graph G = (G0, G1, ∂0, ∂1) identified by the following data:
G0 = {S,M,P, •} (4.8)
G1 = {sp, sm,mp, •s, •m, •p, ••, s•,m•,p•}
∂0 :

sp 7→ S
sm 7→ S
mp 7→ S
•s 7→ •
•m 7→ •
•p 7→ •
•• 7→ •
s• 7→ S
m• 7→M
p• 7→ P

: G1 → G0
∂1 :

sp 7→ P
sm 7→M
mp 7→ P
•s 7→ S
•m 7→M
•p 7→ P
•• 7→ •
s• 7→ •
m• 7→ •
p• 7→ •

: G1 → G0
in which we have indicated the node M too, in view of the way the diagrams (4.6) will be
used below to verify the validity of syllogistic arguments.
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Formally the diagrams (4.6) are identified by the following homomorphisms of graphs:
- for ASP , DA(S, P ) : [ 0
01 // 1 ]→ G identified by the following assignments:
– on the nodes: [
0 7→ S
1 7→ P
]
– on the arcs: [
01 7→ sp ]
- for ESP , DE(S, P ) : [ 0
01 // 1 2
21oo ]→ G identified by the following assignments:
– on the nodes:  0 7→ S1 7→ •
2 7→ P

– on the arcs [
01 7→ s•
21 7→ p•
]
- for ISP , DI(S, P ) : [ 0 1
10oo 12 // 2 ]→ G identified by the following assignments:
– on the nodes:  0 7→ S1 7→ •
2 7→ P

– on the arcs [
10 7→ •s
12 7→ •p
]
- for OSP , DO(S, P ) : [ 0 1
12 //10oo 2 3
32oo ] → G identified by the following assign-
ments:
– on the nodes: 
0 7→ S
1 7→ •
2 7→ •
3 7→ P

– on the arcs  10 7→ •s12 7→ ••
32 7→ p•

so that it is possible to understand from where the labels of diagrams (4.6) come: they
are just abbreviations of the names of the homomorphisms of graphs that identify those
diagrams. As an exercise the reader could explicitly describe the remaining diagrams
DA(S,M), DA(M,P ), DE(S,M), DE(M,S), . . .
Now we describe how the diagrams (4.6) can be employed to verify the validity of a
given syllogism, in accordance with the following algorithm:
(1) Recognize the terms S,M,P in the given syllogism.
(2) Represent the premisses and the conclusion of the syllogism by means of the corresponding
diagrams.
(3) Superpose the diagrams for the premisses on the middle term M .
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(4) If, after (3), M is between two discordantly oriented arrows, such as in the sequence
→M ← or in the sequence ←M →, then the calculation halts and the syllogism under
consideration is not valid.
(5) If, after (3), M is between two concordantly oriented arrows, such as in the sequence →
M → or in the sequence←M ←, then the calculation proceeds futher by substituting the
whole sequence with one concordantly oriented arrow, namely with → or ← respectively,
thus deleting the middle term M .
(6) If, after (5), the obtained diagram is not among the diagrams (4.6), the calculation halts
and the syllogism under consideration is not valid.
(7) If, after (5), the obtained diagram is among the diagrams (4.6) but does not coincide
with the one for the conclusion, then the calculation halts and the syllogism under
consideration is not valid.
(8) If, after (5), the obtained diagram is among the diagrams (4.6) and coincides with the
one for the conclusion, then the calculation halts and the syllogism under consideration
is valid.
The procedure of calculation we just described can be seen to be very easily implementable
by having a look at some examples of its employment. For instance, we can formally prove
that the syllogisms (4.3) and (4.4) are valid and that (4.5) is not. We repropose them below
together with the calculation of their validity beside, like this:
- for (4.3),
Every mammal is not able to fly, M //
EMP• Poo by (1),(2)
Every donkey is a mammal, S
ASM // M by (1),(2)
therefore S
ASM // M
EMP// • Poo by (3)
Every donkey is not able to fly S //
ESP• Poo by (1),(2),(5),(8)
- for (4.4),
Every mammal is able to fly, M
AMP // P by (1),(2)
Some mammal is a donkey, M
IMS•oo // S by (1),(2)
therefore S
ISM• //oo M AMP // P by (3)
Some donkey is able to fly S
ISP•oo // P by (1),(2),(5),(8)
- for (4.5),
Every mammal is not able to fly, M //
EMP• Poo by (1),(2)
Some mammal is a donkey, M
IMS•oo // S by (1),(2)
therefore S
ISM•oo // M EMP// • Poo by (3)
Some donkey is able to fly S
OSP•oo // • Poo by (5) but,
by (7), the syllogism is not valid, since the diagram for the conclusion is S
ISP•oo // P .
Remark 4.5. The diagrammatic calculus at issue is even more rapidly implementable by
making the crucial deductive step of calculation in (5) amount to a formal operation of
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composition. For instance, in order to conclude that the syllogism (4.3) is valid it suffices to
consider the drawing
S
ASM // 77M
EMP// • Poo (4.9)
from which it is possible to read off the diagram S
ISP•oo // P for the seeked conclusion.
In order to conclude that the syllogism (4.5) is not valid it suffices to consider the drawing
S
ISM• 77//oo M EMP// • Poo (4.10)
from which it is possible to read off the diagram S
OSP•oo // • Poo which is not the
one for the indicated conclusion.
Notation 4.6. The dashed arrows employed in the drawings (4.9), (4.10) result by virtue
of the implementation of a step of logical calculation. Because of this they have been put
in evidence by drawing them as dashed. This is a convenient notation that we will employ
throughout this section and later on in the paper.
Theorem 4.7 below is the main result concerning the diagrammatic calculus under
discussion. As already mentioned it is proved in detail in [14].
Theorem 4.7. A syllogism if valid if and only if its conclusion follows from its premisses
as the result of the diagrammatic procedure of logical calculation that we previously described
in steps from (1) to (8).
4.3. A rejection criterion. In implementing the diagrammatic procedure of calculation
that we described in subsection 4.2 no symbol • is created or deleted; so a necessary condition
for the validity of a syllogism is the following: in the diagram for the conclusion of a valid
syllogism there must be as many symbols • as they are in total in the diagrams for its
premisses. On the base of this, it is immediate to establish that the syllogism (4.5) is not
valid, since two symbols • are in the diagrams for its premisses whereas just one is in the
diagram for its conclusion. On the other hand, it is immediate to verify that the syllogism
Every mammal is not able to fly,
Every donkey is not a mammal
therefore
Some donkey is not able to fly
is not valid, although two symbols • are in the diagrams for its premisses as well as in the
diagram for its conclusion; thus showing that the condition at issue is not sufficient for the
validity of a syllogism. The necessary condition that we have just described is a rejection
criterion intrinsic to the calculus; thanks to it, the invalid 232 syllogisms can be easily
rejected;
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4.4. The managing of existential import. With reference to the categorical propositions
in the square of opposition it is observed that propositions of the form ISP logically follow
from propositions of the form ASP and that propositions of the form OSP logically follow
from propositions of the form ESP . This is correct only if existential import is assumed;
otherwise it is possible to exhibit suitable counterexamples. Existential import is the explicit
assumption of existence of some individual in the extension of a term. To clarify matters,
let us consider the first order encoding of syllogistic. Syllogistic can be encoded in a first
order logical calculus by means of three unary predicates, that is S(x), M(x) and P (x).
The categorical propositions in the square of opposition take the form of corresponding well
formed formulas, like this:
ASP : ∀x.(S(x)⇒ P (x)) ESP : ∀x.(S(x)⇒ ¬P (x))
ISP : ∃x.(S(x) ∧ P (x)) OSP : ∃x.(S(x) ∧ ¬P (x))
Now, on one hand it is possible to prove
∃x.S(x),∀x.(S(x)⇒ P (x)) ` ∃x.(S(x) ∧ P (x)) (4.11)
and
∃x.S(x),∀x.(S(x)⇒ ¬P (x)) ` ∃x.(S(x) ∧ ¬P (x)) (4.12)
by virtue of the condition of existential import which is ∃x.S(x); on the other hand it is
possible to produce counterexamples to
∀x.(S(x)⇒ P (x)) ` ∃x.(S(x) ∧ P (x)) (4.13)
and
∀x.(S(x)⇒ ¬P (x)) ` ∃x.(S(x) ∧ ¬P (x)) (4.14)
As a consequence of the rejection criterion discussed in subsection 4.3, in the dia-
grammatic calculus that we are describing the logical deductions corresponding to (4.13)
and (4.14) cannot be implemented. On the other hand, the logical deductions corresponding
to (4.11) and (4.12) can be implemented provided a suitable diagrammatic condition of
existential import is taken into account, that is
S
ISS•oo // S
to be read as “Some S is S” to mean “Some S exists”, by virtue of which it is possible to
calculate
- for (4.11):
S
ISS• 77oo // S ASP // P
that is ISS ,ASP ` ISP ;
- for (4.12):
S
ISS• 88oo // S ESP// • Poo
that is ISS ,ESP ` OSP .
Among the 24 valid syllogisms identified by Aristotle, those which are valid under existential
import are 9. They are precisely those with premisses which are both universal and conclusion
which is particular.
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4.5. Contradiction via diagrams. The diagrams (4.6) have been introduced in place of
corresponding categorical propositions toward the obtainment of a “diagrammatic square
of opposition”. It is possibile to verify that all of the interrelations that we did not
mention, linking the categorical propositions in the original square of opposition (4.1)
hold correspondingly in its diagrammatic counterpart (4.6); see [14] for details, but also
consider that what we actually did in subsection 4.4 was showing that the so-called laws
of subalternation are diagrammatically deducible, for instance. Now, diagrammatic
contradiction is expressed by a diagram such as X
OXX•oo // • Xoo that has to
be contradictorially read as “Some X is not X”. By means of a suitable diagrammatic
calculation, one can show that the diagrams that occupy the diagonally opposite vertices in
the diagrammatic square (4.6) are in contradiction:
- for S
ASP // P and S
OSP•oo // • Poo :
S
OSP•oo // • Poo SASPoogg
from which it is possible to read off the diagram S
OSS•oo // • Soo ;
- for S
ISP•oo // P and S //ESP• Poo :
S
ISP• 77oo // P ESP// • Soo
from which it is possible to read off the diagram S
OSS•oo // • Soo .
To further clarify matters, we observe that in the original square of opposition (4.1) the
categorical propositions of the form ASP , ESP are contrary to each other. A priori, cate-
gorical propositions of that form can be jointly affirmed without producing a contradiction,
since to assume that they hold together leads to conclude that the extension of S must be
empty. In first order logic, this is given by the provability of the logical consequence
∀x.(S(x)⇒ P (x)), ∀x.(S(x)⇒ ¬P (x)) ` ∀x.(S(x)⇒ ¬S(x))
that is diagrammatically very quickly expressed by the drawing
S 88
ASP // P
ESP// • Soo
from which it is possibile to read off the diagram S //
ESS• Soo for the categorical
proposition “Every S is not S” or, informally, for “S is empty”. On the other hand, if the
existence of some individual in the extension of the term S is assumed, via the condition of
existential import S
ISS•oo // S , see subsection 4.4, then from it and the previously
deduced diagram for ESS , the contradictory diagram for OSS is diagrammatically deducible.
4.6. Formalizing the calculus. Just after the diagrammatic square of opposition (4.6) we
requested to consider each of the diagrams that form it as an indecomposable piece of syntax.
In this subsection we rigorously justify this request by formalizing the employment that we
made so far of the diagrams (4.6), within a suitable diagrammatic deductive system
that we name SYLL. Most of the content of this subsection is from [14], but appropriately
reworked.
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Definition 4.8. The syntactic primitives of SYLL are the symbols •, →, ← toghether
with a denumerable amount of term-variables A,B,C, . . . ,M, P, S, . . .. The syllogistic
diagrams of SYLL are the labelled diagrams in the diagrammatic square 4.6. A diagram
of SYLL is a finite list of arrow symbols separated by a single bullet symbol • or a single
term-variable, beginning and ending at a term-variable. The reversal of a diagram is a
diagram, the one obtained by specular symmetry from the original diagram. A part of a
diagram is a finite list of consecutive components of a diagram.
Remark 4.9. The reversal of the syllogistic diagrams (4.6) are
P S
ASPoo P //
EPS• Soo
P
IPS•oo // S P // OSP• • //oo S
(4.15)
to clarify that because of their asymmetry ASP and OSP are not equivalent to their respective
reversals, that one could be tempted to identify with APS and OPS ; whereas because of their
symmetry ISP and ESP are equivalent to their respective reversals IPS , EPS , in accordance
with the fact that the formulas ∃x.(S(x) ∧ P (x)), ∃x.(P (x) ∧ S(x)) are equivalent, and the
formulas ∀x.(S(x)⇒ ¬P (x)), ∀x.(P (x)⇒ ¬S(x)) are equivalent.
Notation 4.10. Whenever there will be the need to anonimously refer to non-empty parts
of diagrams, they will be henceforth denoted by a symbol ∗. In order to explicitly distinguish
a part with respect to a whole diagram we adopt a sort of heterogeneous notation mixing
∗ symbols and syntactic primitives. For instance, the writing ∗ → A refers to a diagram
in which the part → A has been distinguished with respect to the remaining part ∗. So, it
may be the case that the whole diagram looks like S → A or B → • → A, for instance, so
that ∗ would refer to S or B → •, respectively. The occurrence of more than one symbol ∗
may refer to different parts of a whole diagram. For instance, the writing ∗A ← ∗ makes
explicit the part A ← of a diagram that in its entirety could look like A ← • ← A ← C,
where the part at issue is the one on the right of the part • ← not the one on the left of it,
that is A← ∗, because of the symbol ∗ on the left of A in the writing ∗A← ∗, denoting a
non-empty part.
Definition 4.11. A superposable pair of diagrams is a pair of diagrams (∗A,A∗) or
(A∗, ∗A) whose superposition is, in both cases, the diagram ∗A∗, which is obtained by
superposing the components of the pair on the common extremal term-variable A. A
composable pair of diagrams is a superposable pair of diagrams (∗ → A,A → ∗) or
(A→ ∗, ∗ → A), (∗ ← A,A← ∗) or (A← ∗, ∗ ← A). In the first two cases, a composable
pair gives rise to a composite diagram ∗ → ∗ obtained by substituting the part → A→
in the superposition ∗ → A → ∗ with the sole, accordingly oriented, arrow symbol →.
Analogously, in the second two cases a composable pair gives rise to a composite diagram
∗ ← ∗.
Definition 4.12. A well formed diagram of SYLL is inductively defined as follows:
(1) a syllogistic diagram is a well formed diagram;
(2) the reversal of a syllogistic diagram is a well formed diagram;
(3) a diagram which is the superposition of a superposable pair of well formed diagrams is a
well formed diagram;
(4) nothing else is a well formed diagram.
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Definition 4.13. The rules of inference of SYLL are
A
IAA•oo // A
S
ASP // P
P S
ASPoo
S //
ESP• Poo
P //
EPS• Soo
S
ISP•oo // P
P
IPS•oo // S
S
OSP•oo // • Poo
P //
OSP• • //oo S
∗A A∗
∗A∗
A∗ ∗A
∗A∗
∗ → A→ ∗∗ → ∗ ∗ ← A← ∗∗ ← ∗
A proof tree of SYLL is a tree where each node is a well formed diagram and each branching
is an instance of a rule of inference. In SYLL, a formal proof of a syllogism is a proof tree
with root which is the conclusion of the syllogism and leaves which are the premisses of the
syllogism. In SYLL, a syllogism is provable if there is a formal proof for it.
Example 4.14. The syllogism APM ,ESM ` ESP is provable in SYLL, because the proof
tree
S //
ESM• Moo
P
APM // M
M P
APMoo
S
ESM// • Moo PAPMoo
S //
ESP• Poo
is a formal proof for it.
Finally, in view of what has been discussed in this subsection we observe that theorem 4.7
can be rephrased as
Theorem 4.15. A syllogism is valid if and only if it is provable in SYLL
Proof. See [14].
5. Ologisms
In subsection 2.5 we discussed facts in ologs and pointed out that they provide the possibility
of declaring equational constraints between pairs of parallel aspects; in subsection 3.8, that
has been shown to correspond to the imposition of suitable identification conditions between
certain formal proofs. The aim of this section is that of showing how to extend the logical
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expressivity of ologs by moreover making available the possibility of declaring constraints
of syllogistic nature in them. Here the approach is informal. We will be mathematically
rigorous in section 6. Toward the pursueing of the previously hinted at aim, in this section
the idea is that of giving an intuition of how it is possible to take advantage of the nature
and peculiar features of the diagrammatic calculus for the syllogistic that we discussed
in section 4; firstly, its compositional nature, see remark 4.5, which makes it immediately
compatible with the natural arising of composite aspects in ologs. The structured models
for knowledge representation that appear because of the extension of ologs with syllogistics
will be referred to as ologisms, as a name which is a crasis between the words “olog” and
“syllogism”. Ologisms extend both ologs and the calculus described in section 4.
5.1. Categorical propositions in extended ologs. To begin the modelling of syllogistic
reasoning, we here describe how to read the labelled diagrams (4.6) in a suitably extended
olog. More to the point, we will be able to identify those diagrams in a suitable extension
O• of the underlying graph of a fixed olog O = (O,F); that is, properly as diagrams of
shapes (4.7) in O•, which, throughout this section, will be the graph obtained from O by
the addition of a distinguished node • to be not considered as a type and, possibly, of arcs
having • as source or target, toward a type or • in the first instance, from a type or • in the
second instance. We hasten to say that this added arcs are not intended to be considered as
aspects. See example 5.2 for a clarification.
Remark 5.1. They obtainement of O• out of O may be somewhat obscure at this point,
but the reader should consider that while writing this section we are projected toward the
actual authoring of ologisms. In view of this, consider that extending an olog (O,F) at an
ologism requires the extension of O at O•, firstly, in a way that depends on the syllogistic
constraints that the author evaluates to impose; thus on a certain amount of subjectivity, as
already observed for ologs, in remark 2.1.
Example 5.2. Consider the olog O = (O,F) described in example 3.21. An ologism
extending O could be obtained by imposing the syllogistic constraint provided by the particular
affirmative categorical proposition “Some person is a woman” by the addition of the syllogistic
diagram
P
a person
IPW• //oo
W
a woman
to the drawing (2.5), toward the obtainment of the drawing
P
a person
has as mother
,,
has as parents // a pair (w,m) where w is a
woman and m is a man
w
•
X
IPW //
OO
W
a woman
(5.1)
or, more formally, by extending the data that identify O, like this:
- For O•:
– the set of nodes of O• is
{
P
pa personq, a pair (w,m) where w is a
woman and m is a man
,
W
pa womanq, •}
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– the set of arcs of O• is
{has as parents,w,has as mother, •P, •W}
where •P, •W are the labels of exactly one arc from • to pa personq, and exactly one
arc from • to pa womanq, respectively. See remark 5.3 below.
– the source and target functions are
∂0 :

has as parents 7→
P
pa personq
has as mother 7→
P
pa personq
w 7→
a pair (w,m)
where w is
a woman and
m is a man
•P 7→ •
•W 7→ •

∂1 :

has as parents 7→
a pair (w,m)
where w is
a woman and
m is a man
has as mother 7→W
w 7→W
•pa personq 7→ pa personq
•pa womanq 7→ pa womanq

Remark 5.3. In the previous example 5.2, the arcs •P , •W have been left unlabelled in
the drawing (5.1) since they are not intended to be aspects.
Notation 5.4. In subsection 5.2 below we will proceed by prescribing how to recognize and
read each form of categorical proposition in a fixed extended olog O• = (O•,F). To this end it
is convenient to explicitly describe the structure of the graphs which identify the shapes (4.7),
correspondingly, that is A, E, I, O. More to the point, we put
A = ({0, 1}, {01}, {(01, 0)}, {(01, 1)})
E = ({0, 1, 2}, {01, 21}, {(01, 0), (21, 2)}, {(01, 1), (21, 1)})
I = ({0, 1, 2}, {10, 12}, {(10, 1), (12, 1)}, {(10, 0), (12, 2)})
O = ({0, 1, 2, 3}, {10, 12, 32}, {(10, 1), (12, 1), (32, 3)}, {(10, 0), (12, 1), (32, 2)})
5.2. Prescriptions.
(1) For A,B any types of O• = (O•,F), a universal affirmative categorical proposition AAB
is interpreted as the diagram
DA(A,B) : A→ O• (5.2)
identified by the assignments 0 7→ A, 1 7→ B on nodes, and 01 7→ is, for A is // B an
aspect of the olog O, if present. That is, AAB is interpreted as an aspect A
is // B .
In general, as already observed, an aspect like A
f // B declares that every entity of
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type A is measured by an entity of type B via a specified functional relationship f or,
in other words, that the units of measurement which are the entities of type B apply
to all the entities of type A, in a way that is specified by f . We point out that the
reading of “Every A is B” made by Aristotle was something like “B applies to all of
A’s”, that is what an aspect A
is // B says in terms of measuring. Maybe, the label
is determines the simplest functional relationship and the one which is immediately
adherent to the usual reading of the proposition AAB as “Every A is B”, indicating
that something relevant to the instances of type A is forgot to subsume them in a class
of instances of type B, which are at least as general as those of type A, if not even
genuinely more general, see also remark 3.19, by means of an aspect A
is // B . In
view of all the above, we prescribe that an aspect such as A
is // B , as a syllogistic
constraint, has to be read by pronouncing the indefinite adjective “Every” followed by
the reading of the label of the type A omitting the reading of the indefinite article which
begins it, followed by “is”, then followed by the label of the type B. Thus, for instance,
as a syllogistic constraint the aspect (2.1), has to be read as “Every woman is a person”.
To summarize, the aspects of an olog identified by the label is interpret the syllogistic
constraints which are imposed by means of universal affirmative categorical propositions.
(2) For A,B any types of O• = (O•,F), a particular affirmative categorical proposition IAB
is interpreted as the diagram
DI(A,B) : I→ O• (5.3)
identified by the assignments 0 7→ A, 1 7→ •, 2 7→ B on nodes, and 10 7→ •A, 12 7→ •B
on arcs, where •A and •B are the labels of whichever, but fixed by the assignments, arcs
with source • and target A and source • and target B of O•, respectively, if present. We
hasten to specify that these arcs are not aspects and consequently their labels are not
text expressions that are supposed to be read, in any sense. For this reason, if present,
they will be unanonimously represented in any graphical representation of an ologism.
See example 5.2. To help the intuition, we observe in passing that a syllogistic constraint
A
IAB•oo // B (5.4)
could be intuitively thought of as the declaration that there is a momentarily unspecified
type • whose instances can be measured either by means of the instances of A or by
means of the instances of B, via momentarily unspecified aspects • → A, • → B that
turn out to be someway comparable since they are common to the type •, although
not specified. In other words, by virtue of the syllogistic constraint IAB the entities
of type A and those of type B are thought of to be at a certain extent comparable,
although in a momentarily unspecified way and measure. Because of remark 2.1, the
kind of declaration at issue could be interpreted as a prescriptive one, to be accepted
in the world-view proposed by the author of the ologism. In view of all the above, we
prescribe that a syllogistic constraint such as (5.4) has to be read by pronouncing the
indefinite adjective “Some” followed by the reading of the label of the type A omitting
the reading of the indefinite article which begins it, followed by “is”, followed by the
reading of the label of the type B. Thus, for instance, the syllogistic constraint IAB in
the ologism (5.1) has to be read as “Some person is a woman” or, equivalently as “Some
woman is a person”.
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(3) For A,B any types of the extended olog O• = (O•,F), a universal negative categorical
proposition EAB is interpreted as the diagram
DE(A,B) : E→ O•
identified by the assignments 0 7→ A, 1 7→ •, 2 7→ B on nodes, and 01 7→ A•, 21 7→ B•
on arcs, where A• and B• are the labels of whichever, but fixed by the assignments, arcs
with source A and target • and source B and target • of O•, respectively, if present. We
hasten to specify that these arcs are not aspects and consequently their labels are not
text expressions that are supposed to be read, in any sense. For this reason, if present,
they will be unanonimously represented in any graphical representation of an ologism.
To help the intuition, we observe in passing that a syllogistic constraint
A //
EAB• Boo (5.5)
could be intuitively thought of as the declaration that there are momentarily unspecified
aspects A → •, B → • which make the instances of type A,B, respectively, someway
not comparable in a measure whatsoever. In other words, the instances of A,B, become
uncomparable in •, via unspecified aspects A→ •, B → •. Because of remark 2.1, the
kind of declaration at issue could be interpreted as a prescriptive one, to be accepted
in the world-view proposed by the author of the ologism. In view of all the above, we
prescribe that a syllogistic constraint such as (5.5) has to be read by pronouncing the
indefinite adjective “Every” followed by the reading of the label of the type A omitting
the reading of the indefiniete article which begins it, followed by “is not”, followed by
the reading of the label of the type B.
(4) For A,B any types of the extended olog O• = (O•,F), a particular negative categorical
proposition OAB is interpreted as the diagram
DO(A,B) : O→ O•
identified by the assignments 0 7→ A, 1 7→ •, 2 7→ •, 3 7→ B on nodes, and 10 7→ •A,
12 7→ ••, 32 7→ B•, where •A, •• and B• are the labels of whichever, but fixed by
the assignments, arcs with source • and target A, source • and target •, source B and
target •, respectively, if present. We hasten to specify that these arcs are not aspects
and consequently their labels are not text expressions that are supposed to be read, in
any sense. For this reason, if present, they will be unanonimously represented in any
graphical representation of an ologism. To help the intuition, we observe in passing that
a syllogistic constraint
A
OAB•oo // • Boo (5.6)
can be intuitively thought of as declaring the negation of the syllogistic constraint AAB ,
namely as declaring something like “B does not apply to all of A’s”. In general, by
means of an aspect A
f // B , everything which is measured by the instances of A can
be measured by the instance in B, like this
X
g;f
''
g
// A
f
// B
by composition of aspects. Now a syllogistic constraint OAB amounts to the declaration
which is the negation of this kind of situation when f = g = is, namely that there is
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a momentarily unspecified type • which can be measured by the instances of the type
A by means of a momentarily unspecified aspect • → A but such that, at the same
time, is someway definitely uncomparable with the instances of the type B. Because
of remark 2.1, the kind of declaration at issue could be interpreted as a prescriptive
one, to be accepted in the world-view proposed by the author of the ologism. In view
of all the above, we prescribe that a syllogistic constraint such as (5.6) has to be read
by pronouncing the indefinite adjective “Some” followed by the reading of the label of
the type A omitting the reading of the indefinite article which begins it, followed by “is
not”, followed by the reading of the label of the type B.
5.3. Ologs as ologisms. In view of what have been discussed in subsection 5.1, ologs can
be seen as ologisms in which the only syllogistic constraints that are imposed are those
expressed by the aspects identified by the label is provided with the olog, if present, or by
the aspects that arise as composite of two such. In fact, in accordance with subsection 5.1,
for A,B,C any types in a fixed olog, on one side the commutativity of the diagram
A
is //
is ++
B
is

X
C
(5.7)
captures the well-known scheme of valid syllogism
Every B is C,
Every A is B
therefore
Every A is C
(5.8)
whereas, on the other side, because of the rejection criterion described in subsection 4.3,
the only way to impose a syllogistic constraint AAC as an aspect A
is // C , by means
of the diagrammatic calculus described in section 4, is by composition of two aspects, see
remark 4.5, as in diagram (5.7).
5.4. Syllogisms as ologisms. Ologisms extend the diagrammatic calculus described in
section 4. We here exhibit a series of examples that convey a sufficiently clear idea of that,
although intuitively. Throughout, the notation (4.6) will be freely employed.
(1) As a particular example of an ologism that captures the fundamental (scheme of) valid
syllogism (5.8) one may consider the ologism
S
a square
is ))
is //
R
a rectangle
is
X
Q
a quadrilateral
(5.9)
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(2) The syllogism (4.3) is captured by the ologism
M
a mammal
EMA// •
EDA
A
an animal that is able to flyoo
D
a donkey
is
OO II
(5.10)
in which, the dashed arrow is the one that has been deduced by means of the diagrammatic
calculus described in section 4, from the premisses
D
a donkey
is //
M
a mammal
of universal affirmative form, and EMA of universal negative form, toward the obtainment
of the conclusion EDA. On the base of what has been prescribed in subsection 5.1 about
the recognition and the reading of syllogistic constraint in ologisms, we can say that
the ologism (5.10) communicates that the syllogistic constraints “Every donkey is a
mammal” and “Every mammal is not an animal that is able to fly” have to be considered
as imposed; from which the further syllogistic constraint “Every donkey is not an animal
that is able to fly” follows.
(3) The syllogism (4.4) is captured by the ologism
D
a donkey •
IDM
''
IDAoo

M
a mammal
is //
A
an animal that is able to fly
(5.11)
where the dashed arrow is the one that has been deduced by means of the diagrammatic
calculus described in section 4, from the premisses
M
a mammal
is //
A
an animal that is able to fly
of universal affirmative form and IDM of particular affirmative form, toward the obtain-
ment of the conclusion IDA. On the base of what has been prescribed in subsection 5.1
about the recognition and the reading of syllogistic constraint in ologisms, we can say
that the ologism (5.11) communicates that the syllogistic constraints “Some donkey is a
mammal” and “Every mammal is an animal that is able to fly” have to be considered as
imposed; from which the further syllogistic constraint “Some donkey is an animal that
is able to fly” follows.
(4) Just before remark 4.5 we proved that the syllogism (4.5) was not valid. The syllogistic
constraints which are imposable by means of its premisses and its suggested conclusion
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can be represented in the ologism
M
a mammal
EMA
IDA
// •
A
an animal that is able to flyoo
•
OO

D
a donkey
IMD
•
OO
oo
(5.12)
Now, by having a look at the ologism (5.12), it is immediate to see that IDA does not
follow from the premisses IMD and EMA, because of the rejection criterion described
in subsection 4.3, to confirm the invalidity of syllogism (4.5). Nonetheless, from the
syllogistic constraints shown in the ologism it is possible to deduce two further syllogistic
constraints:
(a) “Some donkey is not an animal that is able to fly”, that is ODA, from the premisses
IMD, EMA, as in the ologism
M
a mammal
EMA
IDA
// •
A
an animal that is able to flyoo
•
ODA
BBOO

D
a donkey
IMD
•
OO
oo
where the dashed arrow indicates the execution of the deduction at issue.
(b) “Some donkey is not a mammal”, that is ODM , from the premisses IDA and EMA,
as in the ologism
M
a mammal
EMA
IDA
// •
A
an animal that is able to flyoo
•
OO

D
a donkey
IMD
•
ODM
ee
OO
oo
where the dashed arrow indicates the execution of the deduction at issue.
Now, a couple of remarks are in order. First, we observe that the deduced syllogistic
constraints ODA in (i), ODM in (ii), are not in contradiction. That is, apart from minor
drawing difficulties, they could be depicted jointly in a single ologism. Contradiction
OLOGISMS 35
in ologisms will be discussed in subsection 9 below. Second, we observe that in both
the cases (i), (ii), one could be tempted to further going on to deduce: in (i) from
the premisses IDA, ODA whereas in (ii) from the premisses IMD, ODM ; toward the
obtainment, in both cases, of the diagram
D
a donkey ← • → • ← • →
D
a donkey
which is not among the diagrams (4.6), so that it is meaningless, and does not impose
any further syllogistic constraint. The moral is that in an ologism not all the syllogistic
deduction that you would calculate correspond to the imposition of syllogistic constraints.
By the appropriate employment of the rejection criterion discussed in subsection 4.3 one
is able to stop at the right level of deduction.
Remark 5.5. At this point it is worth to observe that remark 4.3 is in line with remark 2.1.
A person examining the ologism (5.10) could not agree with the constraint “Every mammal
is not an animal that is able to fly”, but this is not a problem with the ologism under
examination, since it is the soundness of the diagrammatic calculus that we are employing
to ensure that the ologism in question is structurally sound. Similarly, one could not agree
with the syllogistic constraint “Every mammal is an animal that is able to fly” prescribed in
ologism (5.11) but nonetheless it is structurally sound for the same previously given reasons.
6. Ologisms, but formally
The aim of this section is that of situate the ideas that have been informally described in
section 5 within a rigorous mathematical framework, with a focus on the way the logical
expressivity of ologs turns out to be extended with the possibility of imposing constraints
of syllogistic nature, by means of the logical calculus described in section 4. The idea that
we pursue is that of looking at ologisms as to extended ologs. Whereas in section 3.5 ologs
have been described from a proof-theoretical viewpoint as labelled deductive systems with
imposed equational constraints, we here describe ologisms under a similar viewpoint as ologs
extended with imposed syllogistic constraints, in the way that we are going to illustrate.
6.1. Ologisms, but formally. In this subsection we describe ologisms in rigorous mathe-
matical terms as ologs extended with given syllogistic constraints, as premisses from which
to deduce further syllogistic constraints as conclusions; that is as ologs provided with a
deductive equipment which we precisely describe below. Before reading definition 6.2 below
reconsider notation 5.4.
Notation 6.1. Let O be a graph equipped with a distinguished node labelled •. We write
O• for the graph obtained from O by removing just the node • and every arc having • as
source or target.
Definition 6.2. An ologism is a 6-tuple O = (O,F , α, , ι, o) where
(1) O is a graph with a distinguished node labelled •.
(2) F is a set of diagrams in O•, see notation 6.1, and the pair O• = (O•,F) is required to
be an olog, that is the underlying olog of O. Every node, or arc, of O• is a type, or
an aspect, respectively. More explicitly, • is not a type, and the arcs of O that have • as
source or target are not aspects. All the nodes of O which are different from • are types.
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(3) α is a set of diagrams
DA(A,B) : A→ O• (6.1)
for A,B any nodes of O•. We prescribe that a diagram in α, such as (6.1), is identified
by the assignments 0 7→ A, 1 7→ B on nodes and 01 7→ is on arcs, where A is // B is
an aspect in O•, if present.
(4)  is a set of diagrams
DE(A,B) : E→ O (6.2)
for A,B any nodes of O•. We prescribe that a diagram in , such as (6.2), is identified
by the assignments 0 7→ A, 1 7→ •, 2 7→ B on nodes, and 01 7→ A•, 21 7→ B• on arcs,
where A• and B• are the labels of whichever arcs with source A and target • and source
B and target • of O, respectively, if present.
(5) ι is a set of diagrams
DI(A,B) : I→ O (6.3)
for A,B any nodes of O•. We prescribe that a diagram in ι, such as (6.3), is identified
by the assignments 0 7→ A, 1 7→ •, 2 7→ B on nodes, and 10 7→ •A, 12 7→ •B on arcs,
where •A and •B are the labels of whichever arcs with source • and target A and source
• and target B of O, respectively, if present.
(6) o is a set of diagrams
DO(A,B) : O→ O (6.4)
for A,B any nodes of O•. We prescribe that a diagram in o, such as (6.4), is identified
by the assignments 0 7→ A, 1 7→ •, 2 7→ •, 3 7→ B on nodes, and 10 7→ •A, 12 7→ ••,
32 7→ B•, where •A, •• and B• are the labels of whichever arcs with source • and target
A, source • and target •, source B and target •, respectively, if present.
Terminology 6.3. Let O = (O,F , α, , ι, o) be an ologism. Henceforth
- the elements of α will be referred to as universal affirmative premisses;
- the elements of  will be henceforth referred to as universal negative premisses;
- the elements of ι will be henceforth referred to as particular affirmative premisses;
- the elements of o will be henceforth referred to as particular negative premisses.
Altogether, the elements of α, , ι, o will be henceforth referred to as syllogistic premisses.
Definition 6.4. The deductive equipment of an ologism O consists of its syllogistic
premisses together with the following rules of inference:
(1)
A
is // B B
is // C
A
is // C
(6.5)
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(2)
A //
EAB• Boo B Cisoo
A //
EAC• Coo
(6.6)
A
is // B B //
EBC• Coo
A //
EAC• Coo
(6.7)
(3)
A
IAB•oo // B B is // C
A
IAC•oo // C
(6.8)
A B
isoo B
IBC•oo // C
A
IAC•oo // C
(6.9)
(4)
A
IAB•oo // B B //EBC• Coo
A
OAC•oo // • Coo
(6.10)
A B
isoo B
OBC•oo // • Coo
A
OAC•oo // • Coo
(6.11)
A
OAB•oo // • Boo B Cisoo
A
OAC•oo // • Coo
(6.12)
Remark 6.5. Among the universal affirmative premisses in the deductive equipment of an
ologism there are, for every type A, distinguished identical universal affirmative premisses
A
is // A , see subsection 3.8. From a syllogistic viewpoint, those particular universal
affirmative premisses correspond to the identity laws, identified and taken for granted by
Aristotle. Since in any case they will be interpreted by identical functional relationships
they won’t be pictorially represented in ologisms, as already they were not in ologs.
Examples 6.6. (1) On the base of definition 6.2, from a purely formal point of view, the
data that consist of a graph whose only node is •, with no arcs at all, and consequently
α =  = ι = o = ∅ identify an example of ologism; actually a poorly expressive one.
(2) The author of an ologism could have the need to fix the state of things described by the
following affirmations:
- Some bird is not an animal that is able to fly.
- Some mammal is an animal that is able to fly.
- Every bird is not a mammal.
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- Every bird is a vertebrate.
- Every mammal is a vertebrate.
To that end, she could draw the ologism
B
a bird
is

''
•oo OBA // •
IMA
A
an animal that is able to flyoo
•
V
a vertebrate
EBM
M
a mammal
OO
isoo •oo
OO
(6.13)
and subsequently to deduce further syllogistic constraints, if possible. In the present case
some of the deducible syllogistic constraints are
- OAB for “Some animal that is able to fly is not a bird”, by virtue of the following
proof trees in which an instance of the rule (6.10) occurs:
A
IAM•oo // M
B //
EBM• Moo
M //
EMB• Boo
A
OAB•oo // • Boo
- IAV for “Some animal that is able to fly is a vertebrate”, by virtue of the following
proof tree in which an instance of the rule (6.8) occurs:
M
IMA•oo // A
A
IAM•oo // M M is // V
A
IAV•oo // V
- OV A for “Some vertebrate is not an animal that is able to fly”, by virtue of the followig
proof tree in which an instance of the rule of inference (6.11) occurs:
B
is // V
V B
isoo B
OBA•oo // • Aoo
V
OV A•oo // • Aoo
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which can be pictorially represented in accordance with notation 4.6 by means of the
dashed arrows in the ologism
B
a bird
is

''
•
OV A



oo OBA // •
IMA
A
an animal that is able to flyoo
•
V
a vertebrate
EBM
M
a mammal
OO
isoo •
OAB
hh
IAV
jj
oo
OO
From a formal point of view, in accordance with definition 6.2 and definition 6.4, the
ologism (6.13) can be specified by the assignment of the following data:
- for O:
O0 = {
B
pa birdq,
V
pa vertebrateq,
A
pan animal that is able to flyq,
M
pa mammalq, •}
O1 = {isBV , isMV ,M•, B•, •M, •A,A•, ••, •B}
∂0 :

isBV 7→ B
isMV 7→M
M• 7→M
B• 7→ B
•M 7→ •
•A 7→ •
A• 7→ •
•• 7→ •
•B 7→ •

: O1 → O0
∂1 :

isBV 7→ V
isMV 7→ V
M• 7→ •
B• 7→ •
•M 7→M
•A 7→ A
A• 7→ •
•• 7→ •
•B 7→ B

: O1 → O0
- F = ∅.
- α = {DA(B, V ), DA(M,V )} where DA(B, V ) : A → O• is identified by the assign-
ments 0 7→ B, 1 7→ V on nodes, and 01 7→ isBV on arcs; whereas DA(M,V ) : A→ O•
is identified by the assignments 0 7→M, 1 7→ V on nodes, and 01 7→ isMV on arcs.
-  = {DE(B,M)} where DE(B,M) : E → O is identified by the assignments 0 7→
B, 1 7→ •, 2 7→M on nodes, and 01 7→ B•, 21 7→M• on arcs.
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- ι = {DI(M,A)} with DI(M,A) : I → O identified by the assignments 0 7→ M, 1 7→
•, 2 7→ A on nodes, and 10 7→ •M, 12 7→ •A.
- o = {DO(B,A)} where DO(B,A) : O → O is identified by the assignments 0 7→
B, 1 7→ •, 2 7→ •, 3 7→ A on nodes, and 10 7→ •B, 12 7→ ••, 32 7→ A• on arcs.
The deductive equipment of the ologism that we are specifying consists of the universal
negative premise DE(B,M), the particular affirmative premise DI(M,A), the particular
negative premise DO(B,A) and the universal affirmative premisses provided by the
aspects M
is // V , B
is // V . The deduction of the syllogistic constraints OAB, IAV
and OV A from the given premisses is by means of the proof trees described above.
6.2. The logical theory generated by an ologism. In subsection 3.7 and in subsec-
tion 3.8 we pointed out that every olog generates an equational theory. In this section,
we point out that an ologism O = (O,F , α, , ι, o) generates a logical theory Th(O) which
extends the equational theory generated by the olog underlying it, O• = (O•,F), see defini-
tion 6.2, with every syllogistic conclusion deducible from the syllogistic premisses provided
in the deductive equipment of the ologism O, by means of the rules of inference listed in
points (i) to (iv) in definition 6.4. In more mathematical terms, for O an ologism, Th(O) is
a graph which is obtained from the category Th(O•) by adding to it all the diagrammatic
syllogistic conclusions which are computable by means of the previously mentioned rules of
inference. In general, Th(O) is not a category, because the only syllogistic premisses which
are aspects are the universal affirmative ones; considering also that up to the application of
the identification condition is; is = is, the rule of inference (6.5) is a particular instance of
the rule of inference (3.4).
Definition 6.7. Let O = (O,F , α, , ι, o) be an ologism. The logical theory generated by
O is the graph Th(O) obtained by adding to the category Th(O•) the node • and the arcs
which are generated by means of all the possible applications of the rules of inference listed
in points (i) to (iv) in definition 6.4 to the syllogistic premisses in the deductive equipment
of O. Thus, we will describe Th(O) as a 5-tuple (Th(O•), α∗, ∗, ι∗, o∗) where
- α∗ is the set of universal affirmative propositions which are deducible from the universal
affirmative propositions in α under all the possible applications of the rule (6.5);
- ∗ is the set of universal negative propositions which are deducible from the syllogistic
premisses in  ∪ α∗ under all the possible applications of the rules of inference (6.6), (6.7);
- ι∗ is the set of particular affirmative propositions which are deducible from the syllogistic
premisses in ι ∪ α∗ under all the possible applications of the rules of inference (6.8), (6.9);
- o∗ is the set of particular negative propositions which are deducible from the syllogis-
tic premisses in (∗ ∪ ι∗) ∪ (α∗ ∪ o) under all the possible applications of the rules of
inference (6.10), (6.11), (6.12).
Remark 6.8. On the base of what has been pointed out in subsection 3.8 it must be kept
in mind that the equational theory generated by an olog provides identity axioms as identity
aspects A
is // A , for A a type. Because of this α ⊆ α∗, thanks to the following instances
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of the rule (6.5):
A
is // A A
is // B
A
is // B
A
is // B B
is // B
A
is // B
and, for the same reason α∗ contains at least the identity aspects, so that α∗ 6= ∅ even in
case α = ∅. Similarly,  ⊆ ∗, ι ⊆ ι∗ and o ⊆ o∗, thanks to suitable instances of the rules of
inference (6.7), (6.6), (6.8), (6.9)and (6.11), (6.12), respectively.
Examples 6.9. Let O be the ologism that has been formally specified in point (2) of
examples 6.6. The logical theory Th(O) is identified by the following data:
- the nodes of Th(O•) are the types of O.
- the arcs of Th(O•) are the identity aspects freely added to each of its nodes plus the aspects
already present, plus the aspects generated by formal composition, that is in accordance with
the rule of inference (3.4). So, the identified set of arcs is {isBB, isAA, isMM , isV V , isMV ,
isBV } and, pictorially, Th(O•) appears as
B
a bird
is

A
an animal that is able to fly
V
a vertebrate
M
a mammal
isoo
in which, to save space, we did not represent the above mentioned set of arcs.
- α∗ = {isV V , isMM , isBB, isAA, isMV , isBV }.
- ∗ =  = {EBM}.
- ι∗ = {IMA, IAV }.
- o∗ = {OBA,OV A,OAB}.
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Thus, pictorially, Th(O) appears as
B
a bird
is

''
•
OV A



oo OBA // •
IMA
A
an animal that is able to flyoo
•
V
a vertebrate
EBM
M
a mammal
OO
isoo •
OAB
hh
IAV
gg
oo
OO
7. Ologisms and their models
In this section we provide a definition of what accounts for a model of an ologism and discuss
a series of examples.
Definition 7.1. Let O = (O,F , α, , ι, o) be an ologism. A model of O is a homomorphism
of graphsM : O• → Sets, which is a model of the olog O• = (O•,F) underlying the ologism
O, requested to furthermore satisfy the following prescriptions:
(1) for every types A,B linked by a universal affirmative premise DA(A,B) ∈ α as an aspect
A
is // B , it must be the case that MA ⊆MB;
(2) for every types A,B linked by a universal negative premise DE(A,B) ∈  as a diagram
A //
EAB• Boo it must be the case that MA ∩MB = ∅;
(3) for every types A,B linked by a particular affirmative premise DI(A,B) ∈ ι as a diagram
A
IAB•oo // B , it must be the case that MA ∩MB 6= ∅;
(4) for every types A,B linked by a particular negative premise DO(A,B) ∈ o as a diagram
A
OAB•oo // • Boo , it must be the case that MA 6⊆ MB.
Remark 7.2. A series of observations are in order.
- A model of an ologism is nothing but a particular model of its underlying olog. This is in
line with what we requested in point 2 of definition 6.2, namely that • is not a type and
that the arcs of O that have • as source or target are not aspects.
- In accordance with what we observed in subsection 4.1 and subsection 4.5, in definition 7.1
the prescription (i) is contradictory to (iv) and the prescription (ii) is contradictory to
(iii).
- The inclusion condition MA ⊆ MB in point (i) of definition 7.1 holds automatically,
because, as already observed in remark 3.19, an aspect A
is // B is modelled by the
function MA 
 M is // MB which is the inclusion of the set MA in the set MB.
- The condition MA ∩MB = ∅ can always be forced to be satisfied. There is a standard
way to do this. In case x is an instance of the type A and also an instance of the type
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B, it is enough to let x be tagged as “A” to consider it as an instance of A, to let x
be tagged as “B” to consider it as an instance of B. Formally, all this amunts to put
MA = {(x,A) | x is an instance of A} and MB = {(x,B) | x is an instance of B}. For
x an instance of both the types A,B, the element (x,A) ∈ MA is not the same as the
element (x,B) ∈MB. In practice, the necessity of forcing the condition MA ∩MB = ∅
may arise not only by virtue of the fact that different types have one or more instances in
common that the author of an ologism would like to regard as distinct, but also because
it may happen that instances which are already distinct in different types have the same
label.
Examples 7.3. (1) The ologism described in point (1) of examples 6.6 has exactly one
possible model, that is the empty one; since O• is the empty graph.
(2) A model of the ologism (6.13) is identified by the assignments
M0 :

B 7→ {eagle, hawk,flamingo, penguin}
A 7→ {bat, dragonfly}
V 7→ {eagle, hawk,flamingo, penguin, dog, cat}
M 7→ {bat, dog, cat}

M1 :

isBV 7→

eagle 7→ eagle
hawk 7→ hawk
flamingo 7→ flamingo
penguin 7→ penguin

isMV 7→
 bat 7→ batdog 7→ dog
cat 7→ cat


All the imposed constraints are satisfied because a penguin is a bird which is not an
animal that is able to fly, a bat is an animal that is able to fly and a mammal, every
bird is not a mammal. The set of mammals is included in the set of vertebrates, the set
of birds is included in the set of vertebrates. As a consequence of this, every deducible
syllogistic constraint hold as well, as the reader can easily verify.
(3) Imagine that a system administrator has to manage the daily shift change between
custodians, inspectors and helpers. At the level of conceptual planning she could design
an ologism on the base of the following prescriptions:
- every day there must be at least one custodian;
- every day there must be at least one inspector;
- no custodian is an inspector;
- to every custodian is associated an helper;
- every inspector is a helper;
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and the result could appear as
•
$$
ICC
!!
•III
|| zz
C
a custodian
has 
//ECI•
I
an inspector
is
tt
oo
H
a helper
(7.1)
a model of which corresponds to the situation about which custodians, inspectors and
helpers are involved in the shift of a current day. Day by day the model has to be
updated. More to the point, a few comments are in order. The particular affirmative
premisses ICC , III are existential import conditions, see subsection 4.4, which are there
to witness that the types C, I cannot be modelled by the emptyset. It is required that at
least one custodian and at least one inspector must be present. Such premisses have
been pictorially represented as shown rather than extensively as C
ICC•oo // C and
I
III•oo // I , respectively, just to save space. The types C, I must be modelled by
disjoint sets, as imposed by the universal negative premise ECI . Finally, we observe that
from the ologism (7.1) it would be an error to deduce that the inspectors are the helpers
associated to the custodians. Nothing in the ologism forces this deduction. In any case,
to exclude that things be necessarily that way, one could add the syllogistic constraint
OHI , to let there be helpers which are not inspectors. The syllogistic constraints which
are deducible from those imposed in the ologism (7.1) are witnessed by the dashed arrows
in the ologism
•
OCI
&&
$$
ICC
!!
•
IIH
ll
OIC
xx
III
|| zz
C
a custodian
has 
//
ECI
•
I
an inspector
is
tt
oo
H
a helper
that is
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- OCI and OIC by virtue of the following proof trees in which suitable instances of the
rule of inference (6.11) occur:
C
ICC•oo // C C //ECI• Ioo
C
ICC• //oo C ECI// • Ioo
C
OCI•oo // • Ioo
I
III•oo // I
C //
ECI• Ioo
I //
EIC• Coo
I
III• //oo I ECI// • Ioo
I
OIC•oo // • Coo
respectively.
- IIH by virtue of the following proof tree in which a suitable instance of the rule of
inference (6.8) occurs:
I
III•oo // I I is // H
I
IIH•oo // H
Now, assuming that custodians, inspectors and helpers are identified by means of suitable
identification alphanumeric strings, a model of the ologism (7.1) for the shift change of
tomorrow is identified by the assignments
M0 :
 C 7→ {C10, C11, C12, C13}I 7→ {H10I1, H11I2, H12I3, H13I4}
H 7→ {H01, H02, H03, H10I1, H11I2, H12I3, H13I4}

M1 :

has 7→

C10 7→ H01
C11 7→ H02
C12 7→ H12I3
C13 7→ H11I2

is 7→

H10I1 7→ H10I1
H11I2 7→ H11I2
H12I3 7→ H12I3
H13I4 7→ H13I4


which clearly satisfy the imposed constraints, as well as the deducible ones.
8. Soundness and completeness
Let O be an ologism. In this section we prove that everything which is deducible from
O is true, that is satisfied in every model M of O. This is what is often referred to as a
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soundness theorem. On the other hand we will also prove that everything which is true
is deducible from O. This is what is often referred to as a completeness theorem.
Definition 8.1. Let O = (O,F , α, , ι, o) be an ologism.
(1) For (f1, f2, . . . , fn) : A → B, (g1, g2, . . . , gm) : A → B a pair of parallel morphisms in
(O•)∗, see point (3) in examples (3.8), an O-equality between them is a formal writing
f1; f2; · · · ; fn = g1; g2; · · · ; gm. For σ an O-equality, we write O ` σ to mean that the
pair (f1; f2; · · · ; fn, g1; g2; · · · ; gm) is in the smallest congruence relation generated by
F , see definition 3.15.
(2) An O-categorical proposition is a diagram of the form DX(A,B) : X→ Th(O), see
definition 6.7, with X ∈ {A,E, I,O}. For σ an O-categorical proposition, we write
O ` σ to mean that σ ∈ α∗ ∪ ∗ ∪ ι∗ ∪ o∗.
(3) An O-proposition is an O-equality or an O-categorical proposition. For σ an O-
proposition, in either cases (a) or (b) above, the writing O ` σ is read as σ is a logical
consequence of O.
Definition 8.2. Let O = (O,F , α, , ι, o) be an ologism, σ be an O-proposition and M be
a model of O. We write M |= σ and say that M satisfies σ if
(1) in case σ is an O-equality f1; f2; · · · ; fn = g1; g2; · · · ; gm, the equality
Mf1 ◦ · · · ◦Mfn =Mg1 ◦ · · · ◦Mgm
holds in Sets;
(2) in case σ is an O-categorical proposition, see point (2) of definition (8.1), one of the
following alternatives holds accordingly:
- MA ⊆MB, if σ is of the form DA(A,B);
- MA ∩MB = ∅, if σ is of the form DE(A,B);
- MA ∩MB 6= ∅, if σ is of the form DI(A,B);
- MA 6⊆ MB, if σ is of the form DO(A,B).
Definition 8.3. Let O be an ologism and σ be an O-proposition. We say that σ is a
semantical consequence of O, and write it O |= σ, if every model of O satisfies it.
Remark 8.4. On the base of definition 7.1, the syllogistic premisses in the deductive
equipment of an ologism are among its semantical consequences.
Theorem 8.5 (Soundness). Let O = (O,F , α, , ι, o) be an ologism and let σ be an O-
proposition. If σ is a logical consequence of O, then it is a semantical consequence of
O.
Proof. Suppose that O ` σ and letM be an arbitrary model of O. If σ is an O-equality then
M |= σ because M is a model of the olog (O•,F), in particular. If σ is an O-categorical
proposition, we proceed by induction on the structure of a diagrammatic proof of σ, by
cases.
- Suppose that σ ∈ α∗ is of the form A is // C . Thanks to the rejection criterion discussed
in subsection 4.3, the only way to obtain σ is by means of an instance of the rule of
inference (6.5), say
A
is // B B
is // C
A
is // C
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with, MA ⊆ MB and MB ⊆ MC, by inductive hypothesis. Thus, it is immediate to
conclude MA ⊆MC, namely that M |= σ.
- Suppose that σ ∈ ∗ is of the form A //EAC• Coo . Thanks to the rejection criterion
discussed in subsection 4.3, the only way to obtain σ is by means of an instance of the
rules of inference (6.6) or (6.7), say
A //
EAB• Boo B Cisoo
A //
EAC• Coo
in the first case, with MA ∩MB = ∅ and MC ⊆ MB, by inductive hypothesis. It is
immediate to conclude that MA ∩MC = ∅, namely that M |= σ. The thesis holds
similarly in the case of an instance of the rule (6.7).
- Suppose that σ ∈ ι∗ is of the form A IAC•oo // C . Thanks to the rejection criterion
discussed in subsection 4.3, the only way to obtain σ is by means of an instance of the
rule of inference (6.8) or (6.9), say
A
IAB•oo // B B is // C
A
IAC•oo // C
in the first case, with MA ∩MB 6= ∅ and MB ⊆MC. It is immediate to conclude that
MA∩MC 6= ∅, namely thatM |= σ. The thesis holds similarly in the case of an instance
of the rule (6.9).
- Suppose that σ ∈ o∗ is of the form A OAC•oo // • Coo . Thanks to the rejection
criterion discussed in subsection 4.3, the only way to obtain σ is by means of an instance
of the rule of inference (6.10) or (6.11) or (6.12). Suppose it to be
A
IAB•oo // B B //EBC• Coo
A
OAC•oo // • Coo
in the first case, with MA ∩MB 6= ∅ and MB ∩MC = ∅ by inductive hypothesis. It is
immediate to conclude that MA 6⊆ MC, namely that M |= σ. Now, suppose that σ has
been obtained by means of the following instance of the rule of inferenc (6.11):
A B
isoo B
OBC•oo // • Coo
A
OAC•oo // • Coo
with MB ⊆MA and MB 6⊆ MC by inductive hypothesis. It is immediate to conclude
that MA 6⊆ MC, namely that M |= σ. The thesis holds similarly in the case of an
instance of the rule (6.12).
Now, by the arbitrariness of M, it follows that O |= σ.
Theorem 8.6 (Completeness). Let O = (O,F , α, , ι, o) be an ologism and let σ be an
O-proposition. If σ is a semantical consequence of O, then it is a logical consequence of O.
Proof. Suppose that O |= σ. If σ is an O-equality f1; f2; · · · ; fn = g1; g2; · · · ; gm, then
O |= σ holds if and only if [f1; f2; · · · ; fn] = [g1; g2; · · · ; gm] holds in the equational theory
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generated by the olog (O•,F), namely the category Th(O•), by virtue of what has been
discussed in subsections 3.6 and 3.7, if and only if the pair (f1; f2; · · · ; fn, g1; g2; · · · ; gm) is
in the smallest congruence relation generated by F which fact, by definition 8.1, means that
O ` σ. On the other hand, if σ is an O-categorical proposition DX(A,B) : X → Th(O),
then by virtue of the way the graph Th(O) has been built, see definition 6.7, σ occurs as the
conclusion of a suitable diagrammatic proof. By cases and by induction on the structure of
such a diagrammatic proof we prove that σ is like that from categorical premisses that are
O-categorical propositions, that is already in the logical theory which is the graph Th(O).
- In case σ is of the form A
is // C , then on the base of the rejection criterion discussed
in subsection 4.3 the only way to obtain σ as the conclusion of a diagrammatic syllogistic
deduction is by means of an instance of the rule of inference (6.5), as
A
is // B B
is // C
A
is // C
with O |= isAB and O |= isBC , since otherwise there exists a particular modelM of O with
M(A) 6⊆ M(B) or M(B) 6⊆ M(C) thus making it possible to find that M(A) 6⊆ M(C),
against the hypothesis M(A) ⊆M(C). For instance, take M(A) = {0, 1}, M(B) = {0}
and M(C) = {0, 2} in the first case, or M(A) =M(B) = {0, 1}, M(C) = {0, 2} in the
second case. Thus, by inductive hypothesis isBC ∈ α∗ and isAB ∈ α∗, thus isAC ∈ α∗,
that is O ` σ.
- In case σ is of the form A //
EAC• Coo , then on the base of the rejection criterion
discussed in subsection 4.3 the only way to obtain σ as the conclusion of a diagrammatic
syllogistic deduction is by means of an instance of the rules of inference (6.7) or (6.6). In
the first case, as
A
is // B B //
EBC• Coo
A //
EAC• Coo
with O |= EBC and O |= isAB, since otherwise there exists a particular model M of
O with M(A) 6⊆ M(B) or M(B) ∩ M(C) 6= ∅ thus making it possible to find that
M(A) ∩ M(C) 6= ∅, against the hypothesis M(A) ∩ M(C) = ∅. For instance, take
M(A) = {0, 1}, M(B) = {0} andM(C) = {1} in the first case, orM(A) =M(C) = {0}
and M(B) = {0, 1} in the second case. Thus, by inductive hypothesis EBC ∈ ∗ and
isAB ∈ α∗, thus EAC ∈ ∗, that is O ` σ. Similarly, if σ is deduced by an instance of the
rule of inference (6.6).
- In case σ is of the form A
IAC•oo // C , then on the base of the rejection criterion
discussed in subsection 4.3 the only way to obtain σ as the conclusion of a diagrammatic
syllogistic deduction is by means of an instance of the rule of inference (6.8) or (6.9). In
the first case, as
A
IAB•oo // B B is // C
A
IAC•oo // C
with O |= IAB and O |= isBC since otherwise there exists a particular model M of
O with M(B) 6⊆ M(C) or M(A) ∩ M(B) = ∅ thus making it possible to find that
M(A) ∩ M(C) = ∅, against the hypothesis M(A) ∩ M(C) 6= ∅. For instance, take
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M(A) = {0}, M(B) = {0, 1} and M(C) = {1} in the first case, or M(A) = {2},
M(B) = {0} and M(C) = {0, 1} in the second case. Thus, by inductive hypothesis
IAB ∈ ι∗ and isBC ∈ α∗, thus IAC ∈ ι∗, that is O ` σ. Similarly, if σ is deduced by means
of an instance of the rule of inference (6.9).
- In case σ is of the form A
OAC•oo // • Coo , then on the base of the rejection
criterion discussed in subsection 4.3 the only way to obtain σ as the conclusion of a
diagrammatic syllogistic deduction is by means of an instance of the rule of inference (6.10),
or (6.11), or (6.12). In the first case, as
A
IAB•oo // B B //EBC• Coo
A
OAC•oo // • Coo
with O |= IAB and O |= EBC , since otherwise there exists a particular model M of O
with M(B) ∩M(C) 6= ∅ or M(A) ∩M(B) = ∅ thus making it possible to find that
M(A) ⊆ M(C), against the hypothesis M(A) 6⊆ M(C). For instance, take M(A) =
M(B) =M(C) = {0} in the first case, or M(A) =M(C) = {0} and M(B) = {1} in the
second case. Thus, by inductive hypothesis IAB ∈ ι∗ and EBC ∈ ∗, thus OAC ∈ o∗, that
is O ` σ. Similarly, if σ is deduced by means of the rule of inference (6.11), or (6.12).
9. Contradiction in ologisms
In this section we briefly address a particular topic: the managing of contradiction in
ologisms. In subsection 4.5 we showed in which sense the diagonally opposite diagrams
in the diagrammatic square of opposition (4.6) are pairwise contradictory. In this section
we discuss how the occurrence of pairs of contradictory syllogistic constraints in ologisms
give rise to contradiction in them, so decreeing their structural unsoundness. We present
the matter by going through the cases that have to be considered. Hypothetically, if one
thinks of the authoring of ologisms as to a computer-assisted activity, the cases that we are
going to discuss should be thought of as those in which the process of automatic checking
of the structural soundness of an ologism under construction should point out a suitable
message of error. In practice, contradictory ologisms may arise because more than one
author is working on the planning of an ologism, and there could not be agreement about
the assignment of a pertaining type to an entity under consideration or about which aspects
should be more appropriately applied. For instance, contradictory ologisms such as those
shown in examples (9.1) and (9.2) below may arise because there could not be agreement on
what should be considered as a vertebrate that is able to fly.
(1) For A,B any types in an ologism, the syllogistic constraints
A
IAB•oo // B A //EAB• Boo
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may occur together in a piece of ologism like
•IAB
EAB
!!}}
A
++
B
ss•
in which two deduced arrows may arise:
- the one through A,
•IAB
EAB
OBB

!!}}
A
++
B
ss•
forcing the contradictory syllogistic constraint
B
OBB•oo // • Boo
- or the one through B,
•IAB
EAB
OAA

!!}}
A
++
B
ss•
forcing the contradictory syllogistic constraint
A
OAA•oo // • Aoo
Example 9.1. An ologism that is contradictory in the way we just described is
M
a mammal
EMB
• •
IVM
ll

a bird
OO
V
a vertebrate that is able to fly
isoo
(9.1)
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although it may seem to be sound at first glance. In fact, the dashed arrow in
M
a mammal
EMB
• •
IVM
ll

a bird
OO
V
a vertebrate that is able to fly
EVM
ff
isoo
allows to read off the deduced syllogistic constraint EVM for “Every vertebrate that is able
to fly is not a mammal”, which is in contradiction with the given syllogistic constraint
IVM for “Some vertebrate is a mammal”.
(2) For A,B any types in an ologism, an aspect A
is // B , as a syllogistic constraint of
the form AAB and its contradictory OAB may occur together in a piece of ologism like
•

OAB
** •
A is 11 B
hh
in which, two deduced arrows arise:
- the one through B,
•

OAB
** •
A
OAA
88
is 11 B
hh
forcing the contradictory syllogistic constraint
A
OAA•oo // • Aoo
- and the one through A,
•
OBB
--

OAB
** •
A is 11 B
hh
forcing the contradictory syllogistic constraint
B
OBB•oo // • Boo
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Example 9.2. As an example of an ologism which is contradictory in the way we just
described one can consider
V
a vertebrate that is able to fly
is
55
•oo OV B // •
B
a birdoo (9.2)
from which one can read off that the syllogistic constraint AV B holds in the form “Every
vertebrate that is able to fly is a bird” together with its negation “Some vertebrate that
is able to fly is not a bird”, via OV B.
10. Ologisms and Description Logics, a comparison
In this section we give attention to the relationship between ologisms as systems for knowl-
edge representation and reasoning, and Description Logics (DL) as languages that can be
considered as the core of the knowledge representation systems formed by a DL knowledge
base and an associated reasoning equipment as described in [1], to which we refer the reader
who is interested in deepening her knowledge about DL. Henceforth, we will write DL-KRS
to refer to knowledge representation systems based on Description Logics. In what follows we
will compare ologisms and DL-KRS as regards some of the basic features shared by the two
formalisms. This is necessarily so, since the comparison at issue is between a well-established
formalism for knowledge representation on one side and a formalism for knowledge repre-
sentation that at the moment presents itself as an interesting, and hopefully promising,
line of work. More to the point, ologisms and DL-KRS will be compared as intelligent
systems for knowledge representation, in the sense specified below, then with respect to
their being general-purpose appoaches to knowledge representation and with respect to the
possibility of representing individuals, defining new concepts from previously defined ones,
and representing binary relations other than the functional ones, finally with respect to the
satisfaction of the so-called open-world assumption. We proceed by following [1], mainly
In loc. cit. it is pointed out that the research in the field of knowledge representation and
reasoning focuses on methods for high-level descriptions of the world that can be effectively
used to build intelligent applications, with reference to a system that allows to find implicit
consequences of its explicitly represented knowledge. Clearly, ologisms are very far from
being effectively usable as implementable intelligent knowledge-based applications; wherever
in the paper we suggested to imagine the design of an ologism to happen on a computer and
as an activity assisted by a computer, we have done that mostly in the form of an auspice in
favour of the outcome of future investigations. Nonetheless, ologisms, although prototypical
and not yet implementable, aim to become intelligent systems in the previously specified
sense. Given the formal specification of an ologism as a knowledge base provided by a linear
sketch for an olog and a set of syllogistic premisses, see definition 6.2 and terminology 6.3,
it is possible to deduce further equational constraints as new facts from those provided in
the underlying olog of the specified ologism, because this is typical of ologs, and to deduce
new syllogistic constraints from the given syllogistic premisses, by means of the deductive
equipment of the ologism, see definition 6.4, because this is what characterizes genuine
ologisms extending the logical expressivity of ologs. Thus, similarly to DL-KRS, ologisms are
knowledge representation systems formed by a knowledge base and a reasoning equipment.
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Very briefly, DL-KRS arise from the need to merge two ways to approach knowledge represen-
tation. On one side there were logic-based approaches considering the predicate calculus as a
tool that can be used to unambigously describe the world; because of this, those approaches
were considered as general-purpose from the very beginning; in passing, let us mention
that most DL are decidable fragments of first order logic. On the other side there were
non-logic-based approaches (mainly semantic networks and frames) that although built on
notions often developed for specific representational goals, turned out to employ formalisms
that have been expected to be general purpose. More explicitly, non-logical systems created
out of special lines of thinking expected to be applicable in different domains and on different
kinds of problems; it turned out that this was not the case. DL-KRS arise from the merging
of these two lines of approach to knowledge representation as the fruitful attempt to put
theory and applications side by side. Ologisms retain the main feature of a logic-based
approach to knowledge representation, since they are general-purpose from the start. This is
so because their design takes place in accordance with rigorous mathematical rules, so that
they turn out to possess an objectively recognizable structure which in principle, although
typically stemming out in connection with the representation of a specific real situation,
turns out to be transportable in different contexts of employment. It is actually like that
for ologs since already exist knowledge-preserving transformations between them, see [20],
while, for genunine ologisms, it is like that only from a conjectural point of view, admittedly,
because the investigation on which knowledge-preserving transformations between ologisms
should be appropriately considered is an open issue.
In DL one works with three kinds of components. There are individuals or constants, concepts
or unary relations, roles or binary relations and a typical feature of DL-KRS is their ability to
allow the representation of relationships between concepts other than the IS-A relationships.
Individuals can be represented in ologs as instances of types that have been passed at the
olog level as types in themselves. Consequently, they turn out to be representable in ologisms
too. Moreover, in ologs, thus in ologisms as well, individuals can enter in the representation
of specific facts. We did not previously emphasize this possibility since we chose to focus
our attention on the description of the most basic constructions allowed in an olog. Without
the intention of extensively pursue the matter here specific facts can be recorded in ologs by
passing an instance of a type to a type in itself, as previously mentioned. For example, if
“Moby Dick” is a documentable instance of the type pa whaleq then to record that “Moby
Dick’s weight is 30 tons” one can consider the fact
Moby Dick
Xis

has a weight in tons // 30
is

a whale
has a weight in tons // an integer between 5 and 30
in which the instances “Moby Dick” and “30” have been passed at the olog level as types in
themselves.
Concepts in DL-KRS are described as classes of individuals, so that they clearly correspond
to types in ologisms.
Other than the functional binary relationships that identify the aspects of an ologism,
which already testify the possibility of representing binary relations more general than the
“IS-A” ones, non-functional relationships can be represented in ologisms as well, by suitably
codifying them by means of aspects. For example, imagine that it arises the need to represent
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the binary relation “is a parent of” from the type pa personq to the type pa childq. The
relation at issue is non-functional since not every person is a parent of a child; nonetheless,
it can be represented in an olog by means of the pair of aspects
a pair (a, b) such that a is a
person, b is a child and a is a
parent of b
b
((
a
vv
a person a child
Now, for what concern the employment of DL as languages for defining a knowledge base
and carry out inferences over it, we point out that a DL knowledge base is usually formed
by a TBox and ABox. The TBox contains intensional knowledge in the form of declarations
that describe general properties of concepts. Typically, a TBox is given in the form of a
taxonomy, which is a representaion of the generality-specificity relation that holds between
concepts. For instance, a taxonomy could be represented as a network such as
Mother

+3 Female Womanks
t|
Parent +3 Person
in which every link provides an “IS-A” relationship. The ABox contains extensional
knowledge that is specific to the individuals of the domain of discourse.
The basic form of declaration in a TBox is the definition of a new concept in terms of other,
previously defined, concepts. For instance, a woman can be defined as a female person, by
writing the declaration Woman ≡ PersonuFemale, where u is the constructor for intersection
of concepts. With respect to the possibility of defining new concepts from previously defined
ones in ologisms, we can say that in this paper we introduced ologisms as founded on those
that in [20] are more precisely called basic ologs, which we descibed as linear sketches. On
one hand, as they stand, basic ologs do not allow any kind of category theoretic constructions
that could be used to introduce new concepts as new types from previously defined ones; the
category theoretic constructions at issue could be binary products or coproducts, pullbacks
or pushouts, for instance. On the other hand, there is also to say that a whole hierarchy
of more “advanced” ologs can be described in terms of more expressive sketches, see loc.
cit., allowing the implementation of the kind of category theoretic constructions previously
mentioned, thus allowing the definition of new concepts from previously defined ones. In
this paper we mainly focused on the extension of the logical expressivity of basic ologs, to
begin with. Anyway, to give an idea of how to define a woman as a female person in an
olog, hence in an ologism, suppose to have the possibility to perform image factorization of
aspects, see [20]. Given this, the type pa womanq arises by virtue of the image factorization
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performed on the aspect pa female personq is // pa personq as witnessed by the fact
a female person
Xis
))
is // a person
a woman
is
<<
where the aspect pa female personq is // pa womanq turns out to identify a bijective
functional relationship, by construction. Moreover, imagine that in the ABox of a DL
knowledge base that is going to be specified there should be represented the information
“Anna is a female person”, about the individual ANNA. This is usually expressed by means
of a membership assertion such as FemaleuPerson(ANNA) from which, by virtue of the way
the concept “Woman” has been previously defined, one consequently derives that ANNA
is an individual of that concept, namely that Anna is a woman. The same deduction is
represented in the olog
Anna
is
..
X
is // a female person
Xis
))
is // a person
a woman
is
<<
where the aspect pAnnaq is // pa womanq is there because of the imposition of an
identification between the aspect is and the aspect is a female person who is which
is the aspect given by composition of the aspect pAnnaq is // pa female personq fol-
lowed by the aspect pa female personq is // pa personq , that is by imposing the fact
is = is a female person who is indicated by the checkmark. Now, the previous olog can
be promoted to a genuine ologism by imposing the syllogistic constraint OPW for “Some
person is not a woman”, as in the drawing
Anna
is
--
X
is // a female person
Xis
((
is //
P
a person
W
a woman
is
99
// • •OPWoo
OO
from which it is immediate to deduce that there is at least one person other than Anna and
that that person is a male person.
In the introduction, we pointed out that the reader should keep in mind that the matter
treated in this paper could be thought of as connected to the conceptual planning of
databases only potentially but, for sake of argument, let us consider that connection as
actually taking place and spend a few words about the conceptual planning of databases by
means of DL-KRS or ologisms with respect to the satisfaction of the so-called open-world
assumption, in particular. In connection with the mentioned activity of planning DL-KRS
satisfy the previously referred to assumption related to the semantics of ABoxes. This
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basically means that it cannot be assumed that the knowledge in the knowledge base is
complete, contrary to what happens in connection with the “classical” planning of databases
where the so-called closed-world assumption is satisfied. The main difference is the following:
whereas absence of information is interpreted as negative information in the classical case,
absence of information in an ABox only indicates lack of knowledge. Things go in parallel
for ologisms. They are objects that have to be thought of as being continuosly under a
process of improvement until an agreed upon version of them is reached. Because of this, the
knowledge stored in an ologism cannot be considered complete but “as complete as possible”
relatively to a certain level of understanding of a subjective view of a real situation; thus, in
this sense ologisms satisfy the open-world assumption.
In conclusion, from the previous discussion it emerges that in comparison with DL-KRS,
ologisms are knowledge representation systems that need to be much more discussed and
developed, nonetheless we think that because of this they represent a challenge and at the
same time an opportunity.
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